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<u>Assignment 1</u>

Error theory (ET) contains two theses. Theses one says that moral thought and discourse is representational. I will call this T1. The second theses holds that there are no moral facts or truths. I will call this T2. With these two theses, this theory holds that we can talk about morality in a descriptive way, but that all such talk is false, as there are no moral facts.

Given these parameters, ET can accommodate and explain (A/E) any data which holds or can allow for moral language to be representational, and which does not require there be a moral reality. Under these constraints, only Descriptivity and Disagreement can withstand alongside the error-theory. Descriptivity implies that moral language is representational (descriptive language is representational) and so T1 helps to A/E Descriptivity. Disagreement implies there can be widespread moral disagreement, which stems from T1 and T2, since if morality is spoken in terms of truth-evaluable language, and if there is no moral truth or fact, this character of deception ET paints of morality can explain why there are widespread disagreements.

ET cannot accommodate any data that requires moral reality or non-representational language. Phenomenology, Independence, Inescapability, Priority, Grasp, Fallibility, Modality, Distinctiveness, and Correlation all imply a moral reality, thus conflicting with T2. Practicality implies that moral language is non-representational, so T1 determines that Practicality cannot be A/E by ET.

Moral realism(MR) compares to ET in that both regard moral thought and discourse as representational. However, MR believes in a moral reality, whereas ET rejects any such reality. So, MR holds that there is an objective moral reality, and that some moral statements are true. In this way, MR can accommodate and explain Phenomenology, Independence, Inescapability, Priority, Grasp, Fallibility, Correlation, and Distinctiveness unlike ET. MR can accommodate but not explain modality, as MR accommodates there being necessary features of moral

platitudes, but cannot explain why. Both theories can accommodate Descriptivity as they both view moral talk as representational language. Both theories can accommodate and explain Disagreement. Realism can accommodate and explain disagreement as it provides there is an objective moral reality, and ET can, as it provides there is objectively *no* moral reality. Both theories cannot accommodate or explain practicality, as that data supports non-representational language.