



Institute for Environmental
Diplomacy & Security @
the University of Vermont

Case Study: Grand Strategy in the Great Game

Strategic Interests and Objectives of States of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization

Fen Wang

Published January, 2012

This case study tracks the evolutionary development of a growing influential regional organization – The Shanghai Cooperation Organization. In order to understand the organization, a diversity of researchers from both the West and the involved states of the SCO were interviewed. Methods of content comparative analysis of both literature and qualitative interviews were adopted in an integrative manner to provide an analytic document for teaching purposes.

Disclaimer: This case has been prepared as the basis for discussion and collective learning rather than to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of an administrative situation.

The Author

Fen Wang is an active civil society researcher whose interest is to engage state actors and non-state actors with global environment governance and maintenance of global peace. He has a diversity of research interests which include: Earth System Governance, Global Environment Governance, Global Climate Governance, Global Collective Security, Peace and Human Rights, Studies of International Organizations (e.g. UN) and Regional Organizations (SCO, EU, etc.), Institutional Reform of Sustainable Development, Non-state Actors, Civil Society and Reforming of the Evolving International System, Global Democratization, and the Evolving New Form of “Earth Governmentality.” He holds an International Master’s degree in science of sustainable development from Linköping University in Sweden and a Bachelor’s degree from Shandong University of Technology in China.

Notice

The study is one of the Clinical Case Compendia Projects of the IEDS under the theme of pragmatic peace. The paper is for the concern of global peace maintenance, as miscalculations of those major big powers might lead to potential conflicts. In the coming multi-polarity world, better diplomacy policymaking would require better understanding of interests of involved nation-states. Strategic objec-

tives of states should always be considered and respected. Thus, transparency among national interests of states is essential for maintenance of regional and global peace, and prevention and resolution of potential conflicts.

Citation

Wang Fen (2011). *Grand Strategy in the Great Game---Strategic Interests and Objectives of States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization*. Burlington, VT: Institute for Environmental Diplomacy & Security at the University of Vermont.

The Institute for Environmental Diplomacy and Security

The Institute for Environmental Diplomacy and Security (IEDS) is a transdisciplinary research center dedicated to both the study and practice of techniques that resolve environmental conflicts, and to using ecological processes as tools for peace-building. We welcome new partnerships and encourage scholars interested in collaborating with us on any of our thematic areas (Borderlands, Pragmatic Peace, Resource Values) to contact us. Learn more at www.uvm.edu/ieds.

The James Jeffords Center at the University of Vermont

As an American land grant university, the University of Vermont has the obligation to play a significant role in fundamental research, as well as evaluation and analysis of policies and programs that affect the public at large in a variety of disciplines critical to global policymakers. In recognition of this, the University established the James M. Jeffords Center in 2009, so named to honor former United States Senator James M. Jeffords for his long and distinguished service to Vermont and the nation. The center is, however, a nonpartisan organization and works in the spirit of independence that Senator Jeffords championed during his career. The Institute for Environmental Diplomacy and Security is a signature project of the James M. Jeffords Center.

Introduction

In 1996, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was still called the Shanghai Five. It was formed during the border conflict settlements and negotiation process of disarmament among the leader of China (Jiang Zemin) and the leaders of four former states of the Soviet Union, namely Russia (President Yeltsin), Kazakhstan (President Nazarbayev), Kyrgyzstan (President Akayev), and Tajikistan (President Rakmonov).¹ In 2000, Jiang Zemin, former president of China suggested an upgrade of the Shanghai Five into an institutionalized mechanism to facilitate multilateral cooperation. Vladimir Putin was also one of key founding figures for the SCO, and was considered one of most important foreign-policy initiatives of the Putin government. Thus, in 2001 the SCO² was officially founded with an inclusion of Uzbekistan as the 6th member state.

In 2002, the SCO Charter³ was agreed upon and signed by 6 member states of SCO during its 2nd summit⁴ in St. Petersburg.⁵ As indicated in the charter, the main purpose and mission of formation of the SCO is to enhance mutual trust and good neighbourliness, to strengthen development and economic cooperation in various fields to ensure maintenance of regional peace, security and stability and to promote the establishment of a democratic, just and rational international political and economic order. The SCO charter further indicates that the SCO aims also to fight the three forces of terrorism, separatism, and extremism, and other transnational criminal activities, e.g. illegal drug trafficking, weapons and illegal immigration. Moreover, the SCO also encourages developing effective regional cooperation on aspects such as political, economic, defense, law enforcement, environmental protection, culture, science and technology, education, energy, transportation, financial credit and other areas of common interest, based on equal partnership and “Shanghai Spirit.”⁶

The achievement of SCO concerning aspects of security, economic integration, and interstate harmonization has significantly improved the image of the SCO. Reviews of the declarations of the SCO also indicate the SCO's commitment to multilateralism, independent sovereignty, regional economic cooperation and security. In addition the SCO embraces the mainstream global peace and reflects on the world situation at each point of the declaration. The SCO is an open organization, which can be proved by the formation and effective operation of its comprehensive liaison system. The Joint Statement signed by the SCO Secretariat and the UN Secretariat in 2010, enabled the SCO to strengthen its cooperation with specialized agencies, organizations, programs and funds belonging to the UN system. Additionally, the SCO views developing cooperation and partnership relations with ASEAN, CIS, EU and other regional organizations with great importance.⁷ Secretary General of SCO Imanaliyev considers that positive interactions between the SCO and the International Society have further expanded the international influence and prestige of the SCO. The result is beneficial, and allows the SCO to play its due role as an important regional organization.⁸ Likewise, Western attitudes towards the SCO have evolved significantly during the past years; the attention paid to this organization has increased dramatically.⁹

In the past ten years, however, the West perceived most SCO members as autocratic powers. The organization has received more criticism and suspicion than positive regard. To provide a deplorable example, the SCO was nicknamed the “Club of Dictators”.¹⁰ The SCO has disrespectfully been compared with the Warsaw Pact¹¹ and was also considered an Asian “NATO” which aims to counter the West.¹² Tisdall strongly criticized the SCO member state regimes for their poor human rights records and lack of liberal-democratic principles.¹³ These claims have been made despite the fact that the SCO had adopted a consensus-based decision-making framework,¹⁴ which could enable relatively weaker Central Asian states to counterbalance the potential unipolarity of Russia or China.¹⁵ At the very minimum this method can be helpful in building nominal equality.¹⁶ Indeed, for Russia and China the SCO can be a useful performance platform to display their principle of democracy in dealing with relations with other states on a global scale.

In addition, accounting for America’s presence in Central Asia, the ostensible manoeuvring for diplomatic influence among these powers has led many theorists of international relationships to regard the geopolitical landscape of the Central Asia as “the New Great Game”.¹⁷ The press had labelled SCO an “anti-western” and “shadowy” organization. Yet in fighting against the three evils, the SCO has improved its image and has thereby found common interests with the ideology of the West.¹⁸ Just as indicated by Imanaliyev, the foreign policy of the SCO follows the principle of mutual trust, non-confrontational behavior, transparency and impartiality.¹⁹ The SCO is willing to develop mutually beneficial cooperation with all the states and international organizations that agree with their objectives and principles.²⁰ Imanaliyev further emphasizes that the SCO is not a military-political alliance; it does not target any third state or state bloc. Furthermore, the SCO does not wish to create a mandate in order to become a military-political alliance.²¹ In the ten years since its creation, the SCO has proven that it has brought many positive impacts to the region as well as to the international society, rather than the contrary.²²

Furthermore, it seems that SCO is relatively more effective than many other regional organizations (CIS, ECO and CACO), and international organizations (e.g. UNEP). As regarded by SIPRI,²³ the SCO has demonstrated flexibility and adaptability in its rapid growth as well as its capacity of forming new networks and mechanisms. The SCO’s agenda is tightly focused. The organization has set up projects and programmes that strictly target its priorities. Thereby, the input-output of SCO as a new institution can be viewed as generally positive. The agenda of SCO is expanding, and alongside this expansion, other states are beginning to aspire to join the club. This movement has led SIPRI to predict the SCO’s further rapid growth and consistently increasing influence.²⁴

Nevertheless, group parties always have their interests in mind. Therefore, core interests of states should be considered when dealing with or examining international relationships. Dr. Niklas Swanström considers that China perceives the SCO’s mechanism and its relations with other regional organizations as an economic

platform. Conversely, Russia views the SCO as a strategic political instrument which can possibly be a national security concern. Swanström further adds that the SCO is not, in fact, a military alliance that aims to counter the West. China and Russia are two wheels of the SCO engine. However, they pursue different directions. That, in conjunction with the fact that they might suspect each other's intentions, may create potential conflicts between Russia and China. Furthermore, the SCO would remain weak unless the two wheels are willing to drive at the same speed, which leads to the conclusion that the emergence of potential conflicts between China and Russia should be actively prevented in order to facilitate and aid the two superpowers in achieving their future mutual prosperity.²⁵

The construction of infrastructures is of strategic significance to facilitating trade between member states of the SCO, as well as between SCO states and member states of other regional organizations.²⁶ The construction of infrastructures (e.g. pipelines), is critical to the relationships between member states of SCO, and their relations with states belonging to other organizations.²⁷ Recent studies indicate that the existence of the SCO as a collective cooperation may offer members precedence for political survival.²⁸ Furthermore, certain studies directly denote that the most conspicuous omission of the SCO Charter—in comparison to those principles stated in the United Nations Charter—is the respect for human rights and the self-determination of people.²⁹ To the autocracies within the SCO, the goals of other regional organizations which aim at benefiting the whole society or electorate at large were comparatively unattractive.

Perspective of China

2.1 Peaceful Rising

Deng Xiaoping's incisive understanding of the international situation after the cold war made him a visionary Chinese leader. He promoted the Strategy of Peaceful Rising in China; his interpretation of this movement was to "hide one's capabilities and bide one's time and rise abruptly on its accumulated strength."³⁰ Zheng Bijian stated that China faces an enormous amount of challenges in the 21st century.³¹ There are five challenges facing China's current development: the eminent shortage of energy resources, environmental degradation, inequalities which create difficulty in economic and social development, and the obstruction caused by a vast scale of natural disasters. Accompanying this list are the international economic, political, scientific, cultural and military pressures and challenges posed by a potential new world crisis.³²

Thus China will not choose to directly confront or challenge America in the coming decade. Conversely, China is willing to develop further strategic partnerships with the United States.³³ As Zheng Bijian suggests, China intends to develop multi-level, diverse forms of interest meeting points, as well as a group of interests with the international society.³⁴ China is highly associated with economic globalization

rather than isolated from it. China's "Peaceful Rise" long-term strategy actually provides an opportunity for a large market in an international society, which is mutually beneficial for China and the United States.³⁵ Therefore it would be wise if China could continue its "Peaceful Rising" strategy, and carry on with a benefits-bonding relationship with the United States.

However, the deployment of US military bases in Central Asia creates a need for a new constructive and cooperative relationship between the US and China.³⁶ The presence of the US military provided a new testing forum for China's peaceful development strategy.³⁷ China, the leading founder of the SCO, views the SCO as a defensive approach to the US's Eastern-Asia containment strategy. In this instance the United States' strategy would be to employ a "v" shape to surround China. The appropriate anti-encirclement defense strategy would be to join the alliance with European countries and other non-Asian countries (e.g. African and South American states). This would allow China to maintain their commitment to multilateralism and to strengthen its relationship with states of ASEAN, via allying with Russia and Central Asian states. The result could be strategically critical to balancing powers with the United States.

Opening the geopolitical gates to include Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey, Serbia and Ukraine could also be a strategic approach for drawing closer to Europe. The possible outcome would be countering the United States' geostrategic encirclement of China by developing closer relations with China's surrounding countries. One method could be to organize military relations by forming bases in the aforementioned states. In addition, China could sell advanced weapons, and coordinate joint military exercises with states such as Russia, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, and allies in ASEAN in Asian region, potentially Israel, Turkey, Ukraine and etc.³⁸ Some strategists consider that the US tactic regarding China is strategic encirclement and containment, although Henry Kissinger considered that this tactic was merely used by the US as a deterrence approach. He warned that the misunderstanding might lead to another Cold War, which would exhaust both China and the United States and drain dry any of the countries who would be forced, out of necessity, to interact with both states. For example, the defensive strategy of the SCO might be misunderstood by the US as an offensive, while the deterrence approach of the US might also be interpreted as an encirclement and containment tactic.³⁹

China has already considered this option. Therefore, the Eastern superpower has attempted to ensure the US that its strategic intention is merely to expand energy and transportation cooperation with the Central Asian states. The motive for this explanation is to deter US suspicions regarding any possible strategic intentions of the SCO. Positioning Beijing as an intermediary between Washington and Tehran would allow China to continue building its "economic muscles" without causing direct or premature confrontation with the US. President Hu Jintao's attempts to amplify China's economic power just like Putin's plays up Russia's "energy muscles." That is why China is keen on developing the SCO as a facilitator of a

regional free market, with Beijing as the dominant economic player.⁴⁰

2.2 Application of New Security Concept (NSC)

As previously mentioned, after the Cold War the world situation had changed dramatically. Following the events of September 11th, 2001 in the United States, global terrorism began to pose a new and unconventional threat to the major world powers. As a result to these changes, the NSC was developed by Chinese's politicians who aimed to adjust the international order away from "bloc" approaches and Cold War legacy thinking.⁴¹

Central Asia has a very important strategic position with substantial energy resources. It is located in the heart of Eurasia where East meets West. The religions and the ethnic complexities in the region give it the title of a civilization "fault area" and "broken zone". Additionally, the characteristics of the region made it become "the great powers' competition and game area". The three forces—international terrorism, separatism and religious extremism—have transformed this area into a base camp. The outcome created a regional turbulent arc land belt.⁴² The threats created by the three forces have extended both regionally and internationally, and therefore have to be dealt with by a collective approach, that is through a formation of the SCO. Fortunately, the initial purpose of founding the SCO was mainly out of concern for regional security.⁴³

China's Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) shares borders with three Central Asian states: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. China's fears of Central Asian Islamic extremists allying with Uighur Separatists have been rising. The result of such an alliance would create a transnational united front. The threat this could pose would force the Chinese to collaborate with Central Asian states, to ensure the security of the oil and gas pipeline traversing XUAR and Central Asia. Just as the internal unrest (e.g. activities of separatists) was once of major concern to the Communist regime, the security and stability of the western border of China is essential to ensure the fast economic growth of China. This sense of security would allow for the stability and survival of the Communist regime.⁴⁴

Long before the September 11th attacks, China had warned the Central Asian states of activities taking place in their territories that support, protect, or train rebels from XUAR. Because of many Central Asian countries' desperate need for investments from China, the warning had been temporarily effective.⁴⁵ After the events of September 11th, China added the East Turkmenistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) extremists to the Western lists of terrorist organizations.⁴⁶ Deng Xiaoping⁴⁷ added that "on a border this long ... if the issue of ethnic minorities is not resolved, then the matter of national defence cannot be settled either." This could explain why China would prefer to use the "tough love approach," so to speak, to solve the issues. These methods could potentially reflect the fact that Beijing has a number of significant national security interests at stake in pursuing the development of stable and productive relations with its Central Asian neighbors (what is known as the "soft approach"). To some extent, the stability in Central Asia ensures the stability of Xinjiang, which in turn means the stability of China.⁴⁸ Therefore, the SCO

has been formed out of concern for social stability.

In addition, because these states share the same or similar views on major international issues, they often choose to work together to promote a just and new world order, democratization of international relations, and address external challenges—particularly those posed by US pressures. These states are the supporters and promoters of a new world order, as well as a new regional and global governance structure. They support the development of multiforms, multilevel, multi-channel dialogues in regional security and cooperation which are based on principles of equal participation and consensus. Additionally, these principles seek common ground, yet allow differences. They proceed in an orderly way through each and every step. They have advocated the promotion of understanding, trust, and world peace and stability. These states share views and communicate on issues such as international terrorism, UN reforms, etc. The SCO and its new security concept created more opportunities and possibilities for member states.⁴⁹ The aforementioned challenges and difficulties have made China, Russia and Central Asian states develop a new security concept, in order to adjust the regional and international situation in respect to regional collective security.

2.3 Energy Security and Economy Diplomacy

Central Asian states, Russia, and Iran all contain vital sources of oil, gas, and other resources. These areas are of interest to China and its growing demand for energy and other raw materials which are needed in order to secure its rapidly developing economy. Ensuring control of Eurasian oil is a logical move which would diversify the routes of China's energy imports.⁵⁰

China was once connected with the Central Asian states through the ancient Silk Road. This historical perspective offers, perhaps, a reason why China is eager to promote the revival of the Silk Road through economic integration of Xinjiang and the eight Central and South Asian states: India, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Afghanistan.⁵¹ The revival of the Silk Road would naturally strengthen China's economic prowess and exert its influences into that region.

Despite Russian claims, China wishes to use the SCO as a facilitator of regional trade and investment. With more than three decades of accumulated economic strength, Beijing is more capable of playing this leading role than any other SCO state. Visionary Chinese leaders see the SCO as a catalyst for the creation of the new Pan-Asianism order rather than the Japanese Greater Eastern Asia Co-Prosperty or Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). An order which could counter America's globalism and its promotion of global democratization in Asia.⁵²

Entering Central Asia through the SCO framework allows China to let its economic strengths "do their own work" at minimum political cost.⁵³ China proposed the "guideline of Multilateral Trade and Economic Cooperation of the SCO", which aimed to realize the objective of free mobilization of goods, capital, service, and

technology. This objective was approved by the Prime Ministers of the member states of the SCO. Other leading powers that are involved in the regional competition admired the achievement of China's bilateral trade and economic cooperation with Central Asian states. However, there is inadequate achievement in respect to regional economic integration and collective security. These inadequacies are highlighted when compared to CIS, EuraAsian Economic Community (EAEC), Customs Union, and other integration processes led by Russia, although Russia is not commensurate with China's growing economic strength.⁵⁴ One explanation is the anxiety of other member states regarding the allowance of this SCO freetrade area plan. This anxiety may be due to the fact that other states' industries are not yet as developed as China's own, and their companies cannot compete equally as well as China's.⁵⁵

Russian Perspective

3.1 Eurasian Geo-strategy

Russia is strategically surrounded by major world powers. This came about via the EU and NATO's eastward expansion, which geo-strategically squeezed Russia's Influence Territory. Furthermore, all Central Asian states were attracted into NATO's Partnership for Peace (PFP) or the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, and became the participating states of the OSCE in 1992. The OSCE tendentiously interfered with the internal affairs of its members, and the EU's proposal for a renewed, more active strategy towards Central Asia in 2007.⁵⁶ China stirs within a "buffering zone" (e.g. Mongolia and US' alliance with South Korea, Japan in conjunction with its presence in the Central Asian states). Thus, geo-strategically, Russia needs the SCO for future negotiations with the US and possible future cooperation with the West. The SCO, in this case, has weight as a bargaining chip. However, at the 2007 Wehrkunde Conference on international security, Putin criticized the United States for plunging the world into an abyss of conflicts. One can interpret this statement to mean that Russia will not stand to be a US subordinate, and is instead a global challenger. This accompanies the end of Russia's subservience to the United States, and marks Russia's return to the days of global preeminence.⁵⁷

Yet Russia is playing with double-sided cards. Russia is using regionalism to counterbalance the increasing power and influence of the US in Central Asia and the Asia-Pacific. Secondly, in the event that China grows too strong within (and aided by) the SCO, then Russia might choose to borrow the US' power to balance China's rising dominion in Central Asia and the Far East. Russia will not want to be subordinate to China, which is a plausible explanation for why Russia is so interested in developing sound relationships with the US. As Matveeva indicates, Russia's joining the organization in 2001 was actually motivated by the prospect of keeping an eye on China's expansion in Central Asia.⁵⁸ One cannot say that there is no such idea existing in the Russian political strategy, however, to some extent monitoring also means communication.

To counter with the US in the Far East, Russia seeks to strengthen its presence and profile. The US has been deepening its relations with South Korea and Japan, whose links with China are also expanding.⁵⁹ The Russians perceive the US' diplomacy approach as aggressive. While west of Russia, any eventual SCO expansion to bring Belarus and Ukraine into its development track would sit well with Russia. Such a move displays Russian dissatisfaction toward the US and their growing strategic presence in the Black Sea region.⁶⁰ The assertive move taken by Russia in the Georgian War in 2008 sent a clear message to the United States and NATO which read "don't push me too hard, otherwise you will have to pay the cost." In such a manner, the SCO will be instrumental for Russia to achieve its geopolitical objectives.

There is further evidence in support of this theory. One example is Russia's assertive move in 2007, which announced that "the 37th Air Army will restart combat patrols over the Arctic, Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Shortly after the announcement, the Russian TU-95 Bears flew provocatively close to American military bases in Guam."⁶¹ To counter the strategic encirclement by United States and its NATO alliance, on Nov. 1st 2010, Russian President Medvedev set his feet on the Russian-Japanese controversial sovereignty territory, the South Kuril Islands, for the first time. His announcement demonstrated that Russia would heavily invest in and renew the military equipment on the island. Such an action was clearly strongly opposed by Japan. Later Russia's Foreign Minister Lavrov echoed that the Russian government would like to welcome companies and enterprises from Russia, China, and South Korea to develop the South Kuril Islands.⁶² These words ignored Japan's sovereignty and stimulated a strong opposition toward Japan. In retaliation, Japan took advantage of the event and asked for additional security support from the United States. Scholars asserted that these moves reflected an extremely assertive Russia, one that embraces the renewal of hard hegemony and strategic strength in the Asia-Pacific.⁶³

3.2 Energy Diplomacy 'War' of Russia

Energy is of strategic significance to Russian economic security and national stability. Russia hopes to utilize the SCO to monopolize power in gas and oil within the SCO territories—in other words, all transit in Eurasia.⁶⁴ However, Russia's reluctance to construct an oil pipeline between Daqing and Siberia indicates that Russia is concerned about potential Chinese control over natural resources in the Far East. A specific example can be given: for over a decade Russia's power, influence and domination over Central Asian states has been relatively waning. Therefore, joining the SCO framework could potentially help Russia's continual exertion of power and influence over Central Asian states. With "helpful influence" from China's economic strength, Moscow and Beijing can share the burdens of supporting Central Asia, instead of worrying that China might be seeking to weaken Russia's influence in Central Asia.⁶⁵ For these purposes, a solid Russian-Chinese

relationship is essential to Russia's national security and stability.⁶⁶

Moreover, the SCO framework has provided Russia with an opportunity to further its objective of returning to its historical peak power status. This is possible through its energy advantages which compensate its economy strategies. For example, using Russia's pipeline system to link the energy wealth of Central Asia, Europe and Asia, in large to pursue its economic benefits. It is no wonder, then, that Putin proposed the SCO Energy Club, in which Russia would be the dominant partner. With accumulated economic strength alongside rising oil prices, Russia may have found a road back to its historic peak. This ambitious step is an ideological turn of events by Putin, Medvedev and a few other Russian elites.⁶⁷

The success of the construction of the SCO Energy Club might face resistance from the Chinese, because the club might potentially turn into a new OPEC. The OPEC is well known for not necessarily favoring the interests of China, particularly when China demands cheap energy resources. Russia is not willing to be subordinate to China, nor is China willing to embrace a tough "Russian bear". China might like Russia's arrogance towards the US, but diplomatically, does not appreciate such arrogance when it is aimed at China. However, Putin's yearning for a greater influence in Asia-Pacific and his ambition for the revitalization of Russia⁶⁸ might bring about the success of such a scenario. Cohen anticipated that "as oil prices rise, it is highly possible that the arrogance of Russia will return". For the increasingly assertive Russia, energy is a political instrument in regional and global politics. To elaborate, growing demand for energy will make the European states more dependent on energy from Russia; this, in connection with further exploitation of Moscow's ties with European states, could potentially weaken the spirit of Euro-Atlanticism and conclusively loosen the US' trans-Atlantic leadership.⁶⁹ Closer relations between Russia and the European states might strategically weaken China's global power status. In addition, it would also potentially weaken China's long-term strategy of drawing closer to the European states, while simultaneously strengthening its relations with its neighboring states.

3.3 New National Security Strategy of Russia

Domestically, Russia has been trying to manage their difficulties regarding Chechnya. Simultaneously, Russia has been facing the spread of Islamic Extremism from Central Asia, as well as terrorist attacks and other threats such as trafficking, narcotics, smuggling, etc. Furthermore, studies indicate that there is still a sense of mistrust between Russia and China, primarily when it appears that Russia is vague about Chinese military intentions.⁷⁰ In addition, Russia is irritated by the US presence in East Asia, Central Asia, Middle East and Europe. Such a presence comprises the strategic encirclement seen from the location of Russia. Russian officials are worried that China could dominate the SCO framework, the result of which might lower the ego of those Russian elites.⁷¹

Maslov directly points out that the SCO is a structure that internally provides mutual containment of its two leading states.⁷² Simultaneously, the SCO plays a supple-

mentary and consolidating role in Russia's relations with the Central Asian states, given the fact that the potential penetration of Chinese economy into Central Asia is inevitable, as is the growing need for energy.⁷³ Furthermore, in pure military terms, a peaceful border with China, as well as the settlement of Chinese territory in Central Asia, could aid in navigating around Russia's outstretched force. From that point it may be diverted both to the North Caucasus (note that Russia intruded and occupied parts of Georgia in 2008) and the border area with China, to focus on the new great game in Caucasus.⁷⁴

Externally, Russia views the SCO as a strategic instrument in driving the US outside of Central Asia. By doing so Russia maintains its post-imperial status and can also continue building a new world order that is different from the one built and dominated by the West. Given that the SCO members face a mutual external threat, the SCO could also be turned into a network with solidarity, implemented to counter the containment of another superpower. Since the day SCO was founded, quite a few joint military exercises⁷⁵ have been performed by Russia, China and other members. In this aspect, the SCO network is considered as an exceedingly defensive deterrence towards outside forces, (for example, the EU, and NATO), especially when the US and its alliance perform military exercises close to the gate of SCO territory. It is then not surprising that observers indicate that in regard to Russia, the main functions of SCO will continue to be security and providing a backbone when facing Western superpowers.⁷⁶ Building a political or security cooperation mechanism like the SCO sends a clear message to the international society that the West is not the only legitimate power in shaping world political, economic and security affairs.⁷⁷

Perspective of Central Asian States

As early as 138 B.C. in the Han Empire, Emperor Wu sent Zhang Qian as an intelligence ambassador to learn about the West. The mission to obtain vital intelligence about the Western area⁷⁸ was fulfilled after Zhang Qian came back to the Han Court and reported back to Emperor Wu. The report provided advantages for the emperor's war on the Hun and led the defeat of the Hun.⁷⁹ The increased contact gradually led to the creation of the Silk Road, which facilitated the trade between the Chinese Empire and Central Asian states at the time. The importance of the Silk Road reached its peak during the Great Tang Empire. In the 13th century, Genghis Khan, the Emperor of Mongolia, conquered and united the entirety of Central Asia. However, with the decline of the Mongol Empire, the revival of Islam, the isolationist policies of the Ming Dynasty in the 17th century, and the fact that later on the Chinese empire was subjected to foreign colonization, the influence of China dramatically decreased. In subsequent decades with the rising of Russia, Central Asia turned into a sphere under the influence of Russia. However, in the two decades following the collapse of the Soviet Union, China regained its interests in the region.⁸⁰ This time around China would understandably hold onto its

power with a stronger grasp.

In the modern world, due to the landlocked location of Central Asian states and the underdeveloped situation of the economy, the Central Asian states are very eager to join into the international and political-economic system. In this region, only China and Russia have the capability to aid Central Asian countries in achieving this objective.⁸¹ As stated by Maksutov, the “Shanghai Spirit” and the value of the SCO allows Central Asian leaders to at least formally participate in generating regional approaches to cooperation and security based on the principle of equality with major world powers. This is an opportunity that Central Asian states have not had in the past.⁸² Thus joining the SCO network is also politically instrumental for Central Asian states, especially in the context of economic and security maintenance.⁸³

In the context of security of economic growth, Central Asian states expect a guaranteed inflow of Chinese and Russian investment to support their power infrastructures. Some of these infrastructure investments are: the hydropower sector and electricity networks, transportation projects, and gas and oil pipelines with which Central Asian states could obtain profits.⁸⁵ Secondly, terrorism, local insurgency and drug trafficking pose long-term threats and challenges to the security of the region. In 1997, Namangani’s Islamic movement of Uzbekistan brought Islamic fundamentalism to Central Asian states.⁸⁴ Such threats have evolved on a transnational level. Therefore, the SCO mechanism provides Central Asian states with more confidence in combating these challenges. For example, since the establishment of the SCO, anti-terrorist, anti-trafficking exercises have been conducted, which have effectively deterred activities of those terrorists and trafficking groups.⁸⁶

Interestingly however, President Islam Karimov, of SCO member state Uzbekistan, also indicated that the two founding members of SCO are using the SCO for their own advantages in dealing with the US and the West, (e.g. in order to confront the rising power and influence of US in Central Asia).⁸⁷ One must also consider that the words of President Karimov can perhaps reflect the worries and fears of those weaker members of the SCO. Thus in order to dispel the worries of states of Central Asia in this regard, China has been promoting counter-terrorist measures and furthering its image as a peaceful superpower. In doing so, China is attempting to establish and position itself as a “soft” regional hegemonic power,⁸⁸ which stands in contrast to the United States’ image.

Nonetheless, there is still fear that the extraordinary growth of China could confine these Central Asian member states to being little more than a supply-base for China’s ever-growing demand for natural resources.⁸⁹ Russia’s “Kommersant” analyzed that after the SCO had been established for 10 years, member states finally realized that China who has been always generous in providing loans to everyone, is actually the “real leader.”⁹⁰ On the other hand, one cannot ignore the possibility that the President of Uzbekistan might want to stimulate the fight between China, Russia and the United States, so that the Uzbekistan could receive the benefits from both or either side.

Similarly, Peace Mission 2005 was ostensibly held under the auspices of the SCO. Studies indicating that the content of the exercise suggest that the SCO is primarily a vehicle for a new Beijing-Moscow's co-domination in Asia. The studies continue by alluding that the SCO is not designed as a genuine multilateral security framework for Central Asia.⁹¹ It comes as no surprise then that the Central Asian states are still seeking strategic partnership with the US. However, Central Asia is geographically closer to Russia and China and their populations and markets. The industrialization of the region determines that the subordinate position of Central Asian states in SCO is almost inevitable. Though this may end positively for Uzbekistan. With a population nearly equaling that of all the other Central Asian states, and its better developed economy, Uzbekistan is more enthusiastic in taking advantage of the SCO framework to facilitate its leading role in Central Asia, and maximize its national interest by balancing the power among Russia, China and the United States.⁹²

Lastly, taking part in the SCO framework also provides an opportunity to apply strategies for balancing the four Central Asian states. Balance must be held between Russia's old hegemony and the expanding power and influence of the rising Chinese giant; as well as between Russia, China, and the West, including the EU and the United States.⁹³ In short, the basic role of Central Asian states in the SCO is to consolidate the sovereignty and independence, to solve issues confronting the economic development, to create a safe and stable social environment, and to lay a bridge that states of Central Asia can utilize to enter into the world arena.⁹⁴

Perspectives of States with Observer Status and Afghanistan

5.1 Iran

Iran has proved a sincere aspiration for joining the SCO. Iran would benefit substantially from admission to the SCO, especially where economic development is concerned.⁹⁵ Iran seeks to benefit in the political arenas by countering the US's economic sanctions, supporting Ahmadinejad's Abadgaran and his party's ideological "looking East" philosophy as well as other political and security benefits.⁹⁶

Iran's acceptance to the SCO would provide an anti-containment power against the US and European pressures on its terrorism issues. Such acceptance would also aid in the objectives and ambitions of regional powers by developing nuclear weapons.⁹⁷ The tremendous amount of oil reserve in Iran creates a strong temptation for oil and gas-thirsty states like China. However, the SCO is aware that accepting Iran with full membership in haste might offend the West, which would be a zero-sum move for China. But the SCO is open to keeping up a dialog with President Ahmadinejad, and even allowing him to participate in the SCO summit where he can openly criticize the United States, which does favor the interests of both Russia and China. However, according to the regulations of the SCO, countries with sanctions imposed by the United Nations cannot apply to join the SCO.

Therefore only if the sanctions on Iran by the United Nations are lifted, would the obstacles in the path for Tehran to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization be cleared away.⁹⁸ Yet, the crass steps Iran has taken make this result far from possible.⁹⁹

5.2 Pakistan and India

Pakistan is interested in obtaining full membership of the SCO as well. Pakistan is willing to pay the cost to obtain SCO membership. The price is an offer which allows China to use Pakistan as an “energy corridor” to Central Asia and the Middle East.¹⁰⁰ In fact, Pakistan’s application for admission as an observer of the SCO was accepted even earlier than Uzbekistan’s. Pakistan was the first applicant after the upgrade of the Shanghai Five to the SCO in 2001. However, China’s inclusion of Pakistan was immediately rejected by Tajikistan, due to Pakistan’s responsibility for the Islamic fundamentalist group, the Taliban.¹⁰¹ China and Russia have not yet reached consensus regarding Pakistan’s membership. Russia has reasons to prefer to include India, while China prefers Pakistan. Russia prefers India because the large country can balance the powers with China in the SCO. China insists on admitting Pakistan for the sake of balancing a potential Russian-Indian bloc within the SCO framework.¹⁰² Due to these discrepancies, Pakistan and India remain as observers, and have not yet been admitted as full members.

India, with its booming economy, is ready for trade and investment with its neighbors to the North.¹⁰³ Obtaining observer status in the SCO would give India a stronger voice in Central Asia, where India’s economic growth largely depends upon the energy markets of the SCO.¹⁰⁴ It can be said that India would obtain significant benefits in market, resource, and weapons imports, in addition to relieving the antagonistic relations with Pakistan by joining the SCO.¹⁰⁵ In fact, both China and Russia are interested in taking India on board, not only because of the increasing trade and growing economic and political ties between these states, but also out of concern for the neutralization and balancing of US power and influence in Asia.¹⁰⁶ While for India, a regulated and peaceful multilateral framework indeed can provide a platform to address regional challenges and balance the rising power of China. For these purposes, India’s interests in joining the SCO are more analogous to those of Russia.¹⁰⁷

There is yet another factor that needs to be considered in regards to the relations between India and the US. It is critical to note the US’ strategic partnership with India for the purpose of balancing the rising power of China. It is a fact that India’s relations with the United States are rapidly improving. Therefore, the consequence of the uneasy relationship between China and the US is that India is forced to step cautiously in developing its relationship with China. Once the American-Chinese relationship reaches its peak, a damaged Indian-Chinese relationship does not do any favor to India in the long run, especially because Indian-Chinese trade is growing fast and bilateral relationships are deepening. Therefore there is no way that India can avoid dealing with this giant neighbor.¹⁰⁸ Beyond the context of Chinese-Indian relations, and for the sake of the Central Asian states, India will be

expected to play a balancing role to the ever-increasing Chinese dominance and declining Russian presence.¹⁰⁹ Furthermore, the admission of new members may potentially marginalize the benefits of Central Asian states politically or economically, as new members also mean new competitors in the contemporary world.¹¹⁰

Thus far, neither Pakistan nor India have been included, and the official explanation of the SCO is that “hasty enlargement of the SCO might bring more serious contradictions among member states, such as antagonistic relations between India and Pakistan.”¹¹¹ While this explanation seems reasonable, in truth reaching a consensus regarding India and Pakistan would take time. Before that could occur, Russian and China would have to balance their interests. Additionally, the interests of the United States must not be ignored.

On Oct. 14th 2009, during the meeting of heads of state governments of the SCO, Prime Minister of Pakistan Yousuf R. Gilani reaffirmed Pakistan’s aspiration to play a more active role in the SCO. After all, Pakistan belongs to the region.¹¹² On a positive note for Pakistan, a joint statement signed by Pakistan’s President Asif Ali Zardari and Russian’s President Dmitry Medvedev states that Russia welcomes Pakistan’s participation in the activities of the SCO, and supports Pakistan’s willingness to join the SCO.¹¹³ Although Russia’s welcoming of Pakistan might be an exchangeable condition for China’s welcoming India into the SCO as well. With strong backup from China, and after winning the support of Russia, one might presume that Pakistan may obtain full membership in the years to come.¹¹⁴ As mentioned above, Iran won’t be able to obtain full membership in a short term. Thus, after Pakistan, I would assume that India would be the most likely state to be updated with full membership.

Recently, the SCO realized that the security of Central and South Asia is indivisible. As previously established, integration of India and Pakistan is clearly in the cards. The 2011 SCO summit finalized the norms and negotiations on augmentation of new members. Therefore, the Russian-Chinese initiative to bring Pakistan and India on board holds out the prospect of dealing a devastating blow to the US’s strategy of embedding itself in Asia. As indicated by Bhadrakumar, “when the process is completed, the SCO would have transformed beyond all recognition from its humble beginnings.”¹¹⁵

5.3 Mongolia

Mongolia is geographically surrounded by the large and powerful nations of China and Russia. Due to its encircled nature, Mongolia is placed in a geo-strategically difficult position.¹¹⁶ Mongolia has been cautious in selecting which side to stand by in order to avoid offending any of its neighbors. Consequently, Mongolia’s geopolitical situation determines that it needs to carefully balance its bilateral relationship both with Russia and China, so as not to be sucked into the orbit of one or the other.

To secure its economic development and strengthen its national security, Mongolia has developed economic ties with South Korea, Japan and the US. However,

the United States' failure to protect its Georgian ally discouraged Mongolia from seeking to rely on the US for urgent and practical assistance in the future. After Hong Kong was returned to China, Mongolia had reasons to fear that in pursuing regional hegemony, China might unilaterally claim Mongolia as Chinese territory, using history as a basis for their claims.

In the short term it is possible that Mongolia may have an interest in seizing the opportunity to multi-lateralize its own highly asymmetric and sometimes sensitive strategic relations with China. In such a case, the SCO framework could indeed provide a genuine platform for Mongolia to express its needs and numerous economic cooperation opportunities openly.¹¹⁷

5.4 Afghanistan

Historically, Afghanistan had been intruded upon by many large powers. In the last century Afghanistan was colonized by the British Empire. Later came the Tsarist Russians and in the 1970s, Afghanistan went to war with the Soviet Union. Most recently in 2001, a war between the United States and the Taliban regime began, and continues to be waged until the present day.

A war-torn state requires post-war reconstruction; therefore quite a few initiatives have been taken in Afghanistan by the United States and other major western countries. Other initiatives have also been taken in Central Asian states and Middle-Eastern areas. For example, the new "Six Plus One" program involving Japan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan as members, developed by the SCO. Though, Afghanistan was included by none of these initiatives.¹¹⁸ Post-war reconstruction requires substantial financial support. Financial support from the international society is still inadequate, and the financial crisis in the US along with the huge financial deficit makes this powerful strategic partner appear to be all talk and no action.

Afghanistan's President Karzai has been participating in the SCO Summit enthusiastically since 2006. Afghanistan's interest in obtaining SCO membership is self-explanatory, considering the economic post-war and post-colonization conditions described above. However, the SCO might reasonably choose not to add such an economic burden to its further development. Likewise the implementations of those projects for economic cooperation, transportation, pipelines, and etc. on others require a substantial amount of financial budget. In consequence the SCO has granted Afghanistan "special guest" status at annual summits, but not yet full membership. Other reasons for this hesitation might include the ongoing war in Afghanistan and America's unclear strategic intentions there. Thus, it is quite reasonable for China and Russia to have a "wait it out" policy towards Afghanistan.

I suspect that the US's intention of fighting the Afghanistan war is also to geo-strategically encircle Iran, while blocking the energy corridor between China and Iran, especially when China is not cooperating with the West in strengthening sanctions over Iran. Considering the US's control of energy resources of Central Asia and its occupation of Afghanistan together with the fact that the US is also capable of

blocking energy transportation through its ocean fleet, the US could influence the energy security of China and potentially choke the economic growth of China in periods of conflict.

5.5 Relations of SCO and the US

5.5.1 Factors that matter in the relations of SCO and the US

The SCO mechanism is an exercise platform of multilateralism used by both China and Russia. Thus, the triangular bilateral relationships between China, Russia and the United States are important factors that impact the relationship between the SCO and the United States. As mentioned above, China might want to create closer ties with the European states, which might inflict potential pressure on Russia, as Russia is not willing to be subordinate to China. Following these circumstances, Russia might try to ally with the United States so as to simultaneously weaken and balance the China's power. If Russia decides to adopt this move, China may choose to take certain countermeasures, which might impact its relations with the United States and thereby, to some extent, impact the relations of the SCO and the United States.¹¹⁹ Another factor that affects SCO and its relations with the US would be resources. The national economic security of China relies on oil and gas, which the United States and its European-Atlantic alliance have the capacity to impact in certain ways. Therefore these securities affect the relationship between the SCO and its relationships with the United States.¹²⁰

Bates senses that the SCO is primarily and overwhelmingly concerned with relations among its own member states, potentially with regard to some external actors, particularly Afghanistan, which is also an observer state. Bates stated that:

So I guess the number one area concern for the SCO that relates to the US that has to do with the future of Afghanistan and the future role of ISF and allied forces in Afghanistan and the future role of the US there, especially after 2014 when it is expected that the US and ISF forces will withdraw or at least end combat operations in Afghanistan. So I guess that should be the number 1 area of SCO concern, and I think I look forward if the SCO really wants to play a positive role in Central Asia and engage the US. I am not saying that is true, but if that is what the organization trying to do, then clearly the place what they should do is relation to Afghanistan and future stability of Afghanistan and its neighborhood. Considering this, Afghanistan has about 8 bordering neighbors, most of those neighbors, either in the SCO or observers of SCO. These bordering neighbors of Afghanistan, they are going to be seriously affected by the future of Afghanistan, whether it is positive or negative, and it is only going to get more uncertain and potentially dangerous with the plan of withdraw ISF and US forces from Afghanistan in 2014, which is only two or three years away. So if the SCO really wants to have a positive role in the region and wants to engage the US, then they ought to do this in relation to Afghanistan, opening a dialogue for example with the US or NATO. About the future of Afghanistan, this

*would be very positive and useful. And not only that and is also very much needed for the future of the region.*¹²¹

Although, Sun¹²² indicates that “the core factor that should be taken into consideration is that the strategic objective of the US in Central Asia.”¹²³ Moreover, as indicated by another scholar,¹²⁴ “the United States and its international strategy of world-widely promotion of ‘value of democracy’, many states of the world are tired of this hegemonic behavior.” Such an observation would be considered as a negative factor that impacts future relations between the SCO and the US. Additionally, Mr. Anonymous further indicated that the financial crisis in the US might indirectly harm the interests of member states of SCO; if that is correct, it would be an important factor in regard to the relations of the SCO and the US. In addition, the ongoing situation of the US’ war in Afghanistan would account for another factor that will be taken into consideration by the SCO.¹²⁵

5.5.2 Mediating role of the SCO for potential conflicts between its members and the US

SCO is still a relatively weak organization which requires more time for capacity building and growth. Given that currently there are potential conflicts between member states of the SCO and the US, the SCO is too weak to be able to play a mediating role. Although, it is possible for China and Russia to play this role as states, via a bilateral approach rather than the multilateral approach.¹²⁶ Similarly, Bates states that “I doubt that the SCO could play this facilitating role, it is not considered at this point neutral enough, and again what matters if SCO members want to do this, that is not clear to me, play that kind of very high state of a diplomatic game, you know that is a serious undertaking, it should not be taken lightly, so I don’t see that the SCO is prepared to step forward to play that role, theoretically, yes, but in real practice, probably not.”¹²⁷ Secretary Sun also added that “the SCO is unable to play a mediating role to help resolve the disputes. Most member states of the SCO also have bilateral relations with the US, and the SCO cannot work as a collective group to directly talk with the United States.” The SCO is not a supra-sovereignty organization, but rather an intergovernmental cooperation. It does not restrict its member states’ foreign policies, as member states have a right to diplomatically select their relations with other countries.¹²⁸

5.6 The SCO and its relations with other regional organizations

China is expected to shoulder much of the responsibility regarding the subject of regional security, yet it does not have the capacity to build a secure relationship with member states of ASEAN and other similar regional organizations. In the respect to regional security, Russia has been more successful than China. The United States and its partners in Asia and Europe posed a strategic encirclement over China and Russia, through their recent activities by these measures of deterrence; they have pressured China and Russia. Therefore in order to escape their strategic encirclement, China and Russia may need to adopt the strategy of creating and developing closer relations with the European states and simultaneously unite vertically with friendly states among neighbors but exert sanctions to

those states that are potential enemies. There is common ground between EU and the SCO, but it is yet too early for the two organizations to join in strategic partnership. In this respect, China might prefer to improve its relationship with the European states through a bilateral approach, rather than through the SCO.¹²⁹

Moreover, Bates suspects that the conditions are not yet sufficiently fit for a productive or substantive cooperation between the SCO and other regional organizations. The intention of the SCO, at this point, is not to engage with those outside institutions while much work needs to be done.¹³⁰

*The purpose of the SCO, as far as I know, is not to put an emphasis on cooperating with other multilateral organizations but rather to focus on its own internal development and improve its cooperation among the countries of the member of SCO. There is an interesting political statement or some high-level visits, which is quite possible, but I don't think any real concrete cooperation will be coming out anytime soon. There might be a strengthened bilateral relationship between Beijing and the ASEAN; the SCO doesn't only consist of China but the other five members of the SCO, who might not share the same view with China. It will require time for China and other member states to reach consensus for collective actions.*¹³¹

As noted by Mr. Anonymous:

*The SCO is developing its first-level relationship with regional organizations such as CSTO, Eurasian Economic Community, and CIS; EU and NATO rank as secondary-level contact while ASEAN ranks as the third-level relationship through the SCO has signed a cooperation memorandum with ASEAN. For the present phase, ASEAN's cooperation with states of Central Asia has actually just started as primary level.*¹³²

Professor Sun states that:

There are already quite a few cooperation memorandums signed between the SCO and other regional organizations. The SCO is open to further cooperation with all of them, e.g. CIS, ASEAN, EU, CSTO, Eurasian Economic Community, etc. The SCO is an observer organization in the General Assembly of the United Nations. However, questions regarding what role the SCO should play in the international arena and what kind of relations it should develop with those major powers are for the future considerations. For the moment, whether there is a possibility of granting an observer status to the EU in SCO or SCO in the EU is still impossible as we observe. There are quite a few prospects for the future development of the SCO, how the relationship between the SCO and other regional organizations should also take into account of the international law.

Sun further states that there are other questions we need to consider.

One is that theoretical possibility and whether there is distance between the practical ability of SCO and its ability of realization. What role the SCO is playing and its responsibilities. We should not overestimate the ability of the SCO, and we should also not think of the SCO as a similar organization to the EU. After all, the SCO is a special international cooperation mechanism which is not only represented by China.¹³³

5.7 Environment Governance of the SCO

SLO's Secretary General Imanaliyev states that:

Environmental issues are important in the development process of our human society, and are also important challenges facing the international society. For realization of sustainable development of the economy and the society, we must pay our attention to issues of environmental protection. I would like to point out that to resolve environmental issues has always been an important direction of cooperation among member states of the SCO; we are gradually improving the relevant cooperation mechanism, and we expect that we could strengthen communication, exchange and collaboration among member states of the SCO by holding meetings of leaders of environmental protection departments and experts of environment protection field and, etc.

The statement from the Secretary General gives the people of the SCO hope. However, where implementation is concerned, there are scholars who think otherwise:¹³⁴

There has been serious environmental degradation among member states of the SCO. Member states of SCO have had a poor performance in regional environment governance. They are simply not doing much, and most of the environment issues are still stagnated on the discussion but not on implementation. The SCO is not playing many roles in this aspect, and there is a low possibility for SCO to play a key role in the aspect of regional environment governance. Compared to environmental governance of well-developed democratic states, the environment governances of authoritarian states of the SCO are the opposite of being effective, especially in implementation. Reasons can be because of lack of funding, limited resources, lack of green technology, etc. As states of Central Asia are most concerned about their political survival, thus, it is possible for environment factors to evolve as means of regional cooperation, but it will not be very soon. Effective implementation of projects of environmental cooperation might take even longer time.

Dr. Niklas Swanström was rather pessimistic about the SCO's emphasis on energy

cooperation, and its response towards the question of what possibilities exist to ensure that environmental issues would be incorporated in regional cooperation. He added that “sadly, only the environmental disasters might be able to warn states of SCO to take more concrete actions.”

Similar to Swanström’s statement above, Sun indicated that “environmental cooperation is on the list of the SCO cooperation agenda. Only it is not yet considered as a pressing issue by the SCO. In fact, in some meeting mechanisms, the issue was covered by the discussion content. The SCO has considered the environmental issues, only because there is a lack of funds in dealing with them. There are no problems with the SCO realizing the importance of the environment. However, the question of who is willing to invest in tackling the environmental issues is still not resolved.”¹³⁵

Policy Recommendations to the SCO

China and Russia share more common strategic interests with one another than with the US. Some of these interests may potentially contradict with the strategic interests of the US in some aspects. Therefore, communication between the SCO and the US should be strengthened for the case that any miscalculation could result in contentment or an anti-contentment ‘war’ between the US and the authoritarian regimes of Russia and China. None of the world communities would rationally desire such a ‘new cold war’ so to speak. Neither would China, Russia or the US be able to afford such a situation. Thus, granting an observer status to the US might be a sound choice in order to avoid misunderstandings and miscalculations. In fact, granting the US an observer status might lead to further amiable communication between the US and member states of the SCO, which would also create trust between Russia, China and the US. In such case, the result would be more advantageous than harmful.

Should the US be granted observer status, it would make monitoring the SCO’s actions easier. In this fashion the US could readily develop its own counter-measures to the SCO. In a positive sense, such monitoring might be beneficial for members of the SCO as well. The outcome of creating more communication would be a stronger trust between member states of SCO and the US. Environmental governance mechanisms would also become more effective in sharing more common ideology with the West. Civil rights among member states of the SCO would improve, and more financial and technological support from the US would be available to help states of the SCO in tackling climate change issues, the greatest challenge facing mankind today. Furthermore, if alternative renewable-energy sources are continually being sought, and low-carbon technologies are being developed and shared, the chances for the SCO to leap-frog the existing regional and world order to strongly influence the next generation of international politics would be greater. Combating the global climate-change threat requires the cooperation of the SCO, the US, the EU, and the international society at large.

Nevertheless, given that US applications for an observer status would have always been rejected, which might inevitably lead to accumulated suspicion and distrust between China-Russia alliance and the US. The result of which would greatly increase the risk that the US and the SCO may butt heads more frequently. At this crucial stage, cooperation would lead to mutual benefits, while the contrary would result in harmful consequences for both China and the US. As an example, by granting an observer status to the US, China would secure the long-term strategy of the peaceful rise of China; it would contribute towards solving those pressing regional challenges, such as terrorism and extremism. In addition, it would also be helpful in solving the nuclear issue regarding Iran and North Korea. After all, observer status is merely a symbol or a nice gesture; it does not necessarily mean that the US will be accepted as a full member at any point in time. If one would think outside the box designed by the SCO manner of analysis, one would perceive that China and Russia must manage relations with the United States either bilaterally or multilaterally. By offering an observer status to the US, China could negotiate for an observer status in NATO in exchange, and Russia could take advantage of the negotiation to enhance its existing cooperation with NATO. Implementing such tactical methods would be helpful in building trust between China, Russia and the US. Working against one another could result in a potential cold war situation. If one recalls history, whenever there is a new rising power that seeks to challenge and replace another already dominating power, conflict is inevitable.

The same principle should be applied to the EU, which means that the EU should be granted observer status, as well. First, it would serve positively towards strategic partnership between EU and the SCO. Furthermore, granting observer statuses to the US and EU would deliver a clear message to the world community which implies that the SCO indeed is an open organization that aims against fighting with the three evils which share common interests with the West. Other potential cooperation between the SCO and EU would aid in tackling regional and global challenges. The result would improve the image of the SCO for those states that hold observer statuses or other states and organizations that are willing to follow the principles of the SCO. Granting an observer status to the US would have yet another important impact. The SCO-territory states who seek to borrow power from the US in order to balance the domination of China and Russia in the SCO framework would be left merely with weakened aspirations.

In addition, granting an observer status to the US might make the SCO more attractive to India and Pakistan. As a result, India's weight and value to the US -in balancing the power of China- would also automatically decline. The antagonistic and negative attitudes India and Pakistan are indeed factual; however, the painful relationship between Pakistan and India should not be taken as a reason for withholding membership status. Contrastingly, China should attempt to play as a mediator between India and Pakistan, which would be helpful in healing the severed relationship. The mending of the rift would be important and beneficial for China in countering the potential deterrence and encirclement strategy of the United States. Nonetheless, should the US be granted observer status, the SCO might be able to play a mediating role, given that there would be potential disputes

between member states of SCO and the US in the future.

In conclusion, granting the US and EU observer status is quite beneficial rather than harmful, while withholding observer status from the US and EU would potentially create risks and counter-productive outcomes.

Conclusion

The General Secretary of the SCO Zhang Deguang believes that “the significance of the practice of SCO is not merely that it created a new model of regionalism, and it has realized a historical achievement in regional cooperation in this great and diverse landmass across the whole Eurasia. More importantly, it created a new era in the geopolitics of the region, which made those states in the region who have been deeply trapped in either forming alliance or confrontation embarks on a new road where they could form non-aligned partnership.”¹³⁶

Rather than considering the SCO as the Asian “NATO”, the SCO is actually more a combination of selected elements and characteristics from United Nations, NATO, EU, ASEAN, Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and APEC. We cannot deny that Russia and China have the intention to use their leverage to end the expansion of the influence of the West, led by the United States in Central Asia. It is evident that the United States will concentrate its strategic priority on dealing with its rising challengers in Eastern Asia now as well as in the future. In truth, the SCO’s intentions are not to counter NATO, but rather to exist as an organization for collective confrontation of internal challenges among members of the SCO, as well as to exist as a defensive collective aimed at preserving its power and influence in Asia. Lastly, the SCO aims to function as a deterrence instrument for cases in which other major world powers behave in a hegemonic fashion.

The SCO functions as a bridging organization between the Asian countries and Europe. Even though the SCO was initially set up as a security organization, the SCO’s priority long-term objective is focused on its role in the economic integration of Eurasia. To specify: through the implementation of a program of trade and economic cooperation between member states of the SCO, both the stability and survival of member states of SCO will be positively affected. These acts are necessary steps toward building the SCO regional freemarket which would facilitate the SCO regional economic integration. In addition, the SCO’s tactical moves are aligned with the ambitions of the member states of the SCO. These ambitions include the creation of a new world order that contains multipolarity, and in which states are drawn together based on the harmonious world concept and a “Shanghai Spirit” that ventures beyond differences in ideologies.

The next decade of land power competition in Eurasia will be fierce. As Mahan

once said: “whoever controls the world heartland, that is who would control the world”. Mastering the world heartland might also help in winning the sea power and air power. For Eurasian states it would mean mastering the Eurasian landmass. America’s presence in Central Asia will continually be considered as a negative factor. It can be stated that member states of SCO would not enjoy the United States’ domination of Eurasia. Member states, in an act of strategically bridging the Eurasian continent, participate in a proactive approach to joining the “Great Go Game” which seeks to minimize Western dominance over the territory. Given two or three generations’ time, the SCO might be able to develop into a “Eurasian Union”.

The founding of the SCO takes place during a time of change in the world order. The world order is transitioning from one of unipolar hegemony into “one super-power and multi-world”. Thus the world is stepping into a historical era of new warring states; it is when these events occur that there are equal multi-majorpowers coexisting in the world competition stage. (Note: the historical era of “Three Kingdoms” in China would most possibly recur between the US, the EU, and China on the world stage). This can still be a relatively stable period.

New challenges in the new era also need new thoughts, new strategies and new practices. The birth of the SCO indicates the rise of Eastern countries on the historical world stage. With the accumulated strengths of member states of the SCO, China and Russia will be ready to engage in the cooperation and competition between new warring states.

In this world political arena, there are fierce competitions among world states in many different aspects, “war of technology”, “war of information”, “war of diplomacy”, “war of land power”, “war of sea and ocean power” are all common terms. Therefore, in order to adapt the current world situation and prepare for the future era of world warring states, the SCO is ready to move away from traditional bilateralism and on to an exercise of multilateralism with “Shanghai Spirit” (confidence, communication, cooperation, coexistence and common interests). Such a change implies a new harmonious world concept. One might argue that the harmonious world concept might work in this peaceful and stable period but may not function in the coming warring states era. However, peace and harmony must be supported and secured by force. During this stage, the SCO’s harmonious world concept might contradict with the Western world’s global governance and global democracy concept. Yet without democracy, no harmony in society could be secured—an approach combining them must be found.

For example, the New Diplomacy “War” between China, Russia and the US ----- Combined approaches of Bilateralism and Multilateralism.

China views the SCO network as a learning exercise for heading into the international arena. Observations of the SCO process indicate that Chinese diplomacy

is heading towards multilateral interactions, in contrast to the past, when China chose its traditional bilateral channels for resolving disputes.¹³⁷ This might not be true, as conveyed by literature that insists China uses two approaches at the same time. The result of such a study concludes that when a bilateral approach is more beneficial, then China will choose to use the bilateral approach, and logically, when a multilateral approach is more instrumental, China will choose to use it.¹³⁸ It comes as no surprise then, that one of the papers of SIPRI stated that China has developed its adaptive nature by impacting the SCO.

In support of this statement, China perceives Russia as a strategic partner in the SCO framework. Russia's "tough" identity, in conjunction with its presence and influence in Central Asia, functions as a bulwark against growing Islamic extremism and America's influence over the region. Meanwhile, China focuses on taking a leading role in regional economic development.¹³⁹ The Chinese-Russian relationship is analogous to a marriage between a "soft" husband (China) and his "tough" wife (Russia). The soft husband has to tolerate the harsh wife at times, but in a critical moment the tough wife will directly confront the offensive third party fearlessly.

China's current multilateral foreign policy strategy is concentrated on assuaging fears of a Chinese threat, which is a theory spread by rivals in international society. China will continue to concentrate on resolving such issues, rather than on dominating the Central Asian region.¹⁴⁰ Chinese leaders are currently adopting a policy of treating neighbors as partners, doing good for those partners, and maintaining friendly relations with them to make them feel secure, and help to make them rich. These motives help to relax the sensitive nerves of the Central Asian states,¹⁴¹ and states of ASEAN.

*The SCO has given China more confidence to initiate and participate in multilateral processes.*¹⁴² China is willing to use the SCO's military exercises as a defensive approach to counter US' encirclement and containment strategy at this regional stage. In this case, when time comes for an advance or offense, China could pour its power and influence into the international arena while using the SCO as a united rear base. However, in the time of retreat or defense, China could implement the SCO as a united regional front, in defense of the growing US presence in Central Asia, for example.¹⁴³ (Note: offense and defense are not military terms here; the author hereby defines them as deterrence terms used in the international multilateral arena.) In a word, China has developed its flexibility and adaptability in the war of diplomacy—a "soft reverse containment" of America in Asia.

Who will win? I suppose it is too early to say. Only history will show.

The grand strategy of the SCO is not to make itself a coordinating organization, but rather a forum for the collective strategy of its member states, among which China and Russia are playing the determining roles. The SCO itself is not a bloc

that counters the West. However, given that the West and the US have remained stagnant for a long time, it is only natural that member states of the SCO should have the right to rise. The falling global status of the United States should not be the responsibility of China or Russia. The SCO is of strong geostrategic significance for both Russia and China, which is likewise relevant for the people of Eurasia at large. Therefore further cooperation of the EU and the SCO, as well as possible potential strategic partnership, should be considered. Europe needs the SCO's markets, while members of the SCO need the "soft power" belonging to Europe also. If the SCO can perceive as much of Eurasia, so can the EU.

Strategic interests of member states of SCO determine strategic vision and thoughts of the SCO. Russia and China share common strategic interests, thus they might also share common strategic thoughts, although there are minor conflicts that exist between their strategic interests. However, for the current phase, the strategic interests are dominating the conflicts, thus conflicts should remain in a subordinate position. Strategic cooperation between Russia and China require patience, tolerance, and communication, and equal interactions between Russia and China. *When democracy among member states of the SCO is realized, from the top-down approach, it might benefit the people of the SCO's territories in the long run.* However, the autocracies and authoritarian regimes of the SCO's member states make it nearly impossible for this to be realized in the near future. Therefore, political reform among member states of the SCO is a necessary approach in strengthening national security and social stability. Such a goal is in China's, Russia's, and Central Asia's political interests.

In addition, the SCO member states face a tremendous amount of environmental challenges caused by environmental degradation, air and water pollution, and other issues. Indeed, resolving these issues requires the cooperation of member states of the SCO, Western states, and other regional and international organizations, particularly the UN. Due to these new challenges, it is all the more evident that the Cold War bloc thinking methods are outdated. Cooperation is more beneficial to all parties in modern times. Such an ideology once again reflects the "Shanghai Spirit" of cooperation, communication, confidence, coexistence and prosperity.

In conclusion, I would like to quote words from Norichika Kanie¹⁴⁴ that "we are at a moment in history in which the rules have changed, and the climate crisis will require creative thinking and a possible realignment of the international order. For Asia, this presents an opportunity to assert a greater leadership role on the world stage in terms of emissions targets, technology and regional cooperation. The future will belong to those nations who understand and seize the moment to build a green future."

Appendix

Table 1. Profile for the Member and Pending Members of SCO, 2010.

*Calculated by the author of this paper with the Data from US CIA (©July 2011 est.), (©2010 est.)
(a. GDP calculated as official exchange rate US \$), (b. GDP calculated as purchasing power parity)
and are sorted and calculated by the author. Total World Land Territory: 148.94 million Km² (CIA), thus
the total territory of member states and observers account for 24% of the world land territory. Total
World GDP: 62.27 trillion (official exchange rate), and total World GDP: 74.48 trillion (purchasing power
parity). yet the total GDP of SCO members and observers account for 22.14% (official exchange rate),
or 31.16% (purchasing power parity).*

Member States	Area (km ²)	Population (cap.)	GDP (US\$ a.)	GDP (\$ b.)
China	9,596,961	1,336,718,015®	5.745 trillion	9.872 trillion
Russia	17,098,242	138,739,892®	1.477 trillion	2.229 trillion
Kazakhstan	2,724,900	15,522,373®	131 billion	197.7 billion
Tajikistan	199,95	5,587,443®	5.578 billion	14.61 billion
Uzbekistan	447,400	28,128,600®	37.72 billion	86.07 billion
Observer States				
Mogolia	1,564,116	3,133,318®	5.807 billion	10.08 billion
Pakistan	796,095	187,342,721®	174.8 billion	451.2 billion
Iran	1,648,195	77,891,220®	337.9 billion	863.5 billion
India	3,287,263	1,189,172,906®	1.430 trillion	4.046 trillion
<i>Total</i>	<i>137,183,867</i>	<i>2,982,236,488®</i>	<i>9.345trillion</i>	<i>17.77trillion</i>
Dialogue Partners				
Belarus	207,595	9,503,807®	54.713 billion	131.201 billion
Sri Lanka	65,610	21,283,913®	104.7 billion	48.24 billion

Map 1. Member and observer states of the SCO



Source: Bailes et al., 2007.

Table 2. Summits of SCO Heads of State

Location and date	Participants	Accomplishments
Shanghai, June 14–15, 2001	China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Russia	Signed Declaration on Establishment of SCO; signed Shanghai Convention Against Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism
St. Petersburg, June 7, 2002	China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Russia	Signed Charter of SCO; agreed on regional anti-terrorist structure
Moscow, May 28–29, 2003	China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Russia	Agreed on SCO flag and emblem, formation of secretariat, administration of budget, and designation of executive secretary; discussed economic cooperation within SCO
Tashkent, Uzbekistan June 17, 2004	China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Russia	Signed Agreement on Combating Trafficking of Illegal Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances; approved observer status for Mongolia
Astana, Kazakhstan, July 5, 2005	China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Russia Observers: Mongolia, Iran, Pakistan, India	Issued declaration on eviction of U.S. military forces in Central Asia; approved observer status for Iran, Pakistan, and India
Shanghai, China, June 15, 2006	China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan. Secretary-General Zhang Deguang of the Organization and Director V. T. Kasymov of the Executive Committee of the SCO Regional Anti-terrorist Structure Observers: India, Iran, Mongolia, Pakistan and Afghanistan. CIS, ASEAN. (China.org.cn 2011)	Issued a joint communiqué; Special attention was paid to the foundation session of the SCO Entrepreneurs Committee, the Forum of the industrialists and entrepreneurs of the SCO member — states, and to the foundation meeting of the SCO Interbanking Unit.(GRATA LAW FIRM 2011)

Bishkek, capital of Kyrgyzstan, August 16, 2007	China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan. (Chinanews.cn 2011) Observers: Mongolia, Pakistan, Iran and India Guests: Afghanistan, Turkmenistan and UN	Issued joint communiqué; The signing of the “Shanghai Cooperation Organization Treaty on Long-Term Good Neighborly, Friendship and Cooperation” by the six member states; The anti-terrorist exercise “Peace Mission 2007” coincided with the summit. (Pan Guang 2007)
Dushanbe, capital of Tajikista, on 28 August 2008.	China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan Secretary-General of the SCO and Director of the Executive Committee of SCO RATS Observers: Iran, India, Mongolia, Pakistan, Afghanistan. United Nations, CIS, CSTO. (Chronicle of main events at SCO in 2008, Home page of SCO)	A signing of memorandum on partnership between the SCO’s Interbank Association and the Eurasian Development Bank; The members worked toward creating favorable trade and investment conditions, development of transportation routes and transit potential, modern information and telecommunication technologies, and facilitate the construction of the SCO Business Council; An expert working group was set up to research on issues related to the membership expansion of the group. (Patrick Frost 2008)
Yekaterinburg, Russia, 15-16 June 2009	Kazakhstan, China, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan Secretary General of the SCO and Director of the Executive Committee of the SCO RCTS Observers: India, Iran, Mongolia, Pakistan, Afghanistan. United Nations CIS, EuraEC, CSTON. (Chronicle of main events at SCO in 2009, SCO web page)	Issued Yekaterinburg Declaration; Issued Joint Communiqué of the Meeting of the Council of the Heads of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization;

<p>Tashkent capital of Uzbekistan, June 11, 2010</p>	<p>Kazakhstan, China, Russia, Tajikistan,Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan; M.S.Imanaliyev and D.M.Djumanbekov Observers: Mongolia,Pakistan, India,Iran,Afghanistan, Turkmenistan (Chronicle of Main Events at SCO in 2010, SCO Home page) Besides: UN, UNECE, CIS, CSTO, EuraEC, ASEAN.</p>	<p>Issued Tashkent declaration; Approved two important draft documents including the SCO Rules of Procedure, which was designed to enhance the efficiency and internal mechanisms of the organization; Results of the Fifth Meeting of the Secretaries of Security Councils of the SCO Member States had been approved (Tashkent, 23 April 2010); The implementation of the Agreement among the Governments of the SCO Member States on Cooperation in the Field of Ensuring International Information Security will be facilitated. (Chronicle of Main Events at SCO in 2010)</p>
<p>2011, June 15th, Astana, Capital of Kazakhstan.</p>	<p>Kazakhstan, China, Kyrgyzstan,Russia, Tajikistan,Uzbekistan. Imanaliyev, and D.M.Djumanbekov Observers: Iran, Pakistan, India, Mongolia. The guest: Afghanistan Besides: UNODC, CIS, EuraEC,CSTO.</p>	<p>Issued the “Press Release of the 10th Anniversary Meeting of Council of Heads of State of the SCO”; A signing of “Astana Declaration of 10th Anniversary of SCO”; The approval of the “SCO Member States 2011-2016 Anti-drug Strategy” and “Implementation of Action Plan”; A signing of “Intergovernmental Agreement on Health Cooperation of Member States of SCO”; A signing of “The Memorandum of Understanding between SCO Secretariat and UN Office on Drugs and Crimes” by Secretary-General of SCO and Executive Director of UN Office on Drugs and Crimes. The summit declared that China will become the president country of next year’s SCO summit, according to the SCO Charter.</p>

Source: Chien-peng Chung (2006); China.org.cn 201;GRATA LAW FIRM 2011;Chinaview.cn 2011;Pan Guang 2007;Patrick Frost 2008.

Table 3. SCO Charter

The People's Republic of China, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Tajikistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan being the founding states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (hereinafter SCO or the Organisation),

Based on historically established ties between their peoples;

Striving for further enhancement of comprehensive cooperation;

Desiring to jointly contribute to the strengthening of peace and ensuring of security and stability in the region in the environment of developing political multi-polarity and economic and information globalization;

Being convinced that the establishment of SCO will facilitate more efficient common use of opening possibilities and counteracting new challenges and threats;

Considering that interaction within SCO will promote the realization of a huge potential of good neighborliness, unity and cooperation between States and their peoples;

Proceeding from the spirit of mutual trust, mutual advantage, equality, mutual consultations, respect for cultural variety and aspiration to joint development that was clearly established at the meeting of heads of six States in 2001 in Shanghai;

Noting that the compliance with the principles set out in the Agreement between the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tajikistan on Strengthening Confidence in the Military Field in the Border Area of 26 April, 1996, and in the Agreement between the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tajikistan on Mutual Reductions of Armed Forces in the Border Area of 24 April, 1997, as well as in the documents signed at summits of heads of the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Tajikistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan in the period from 1998 to 2001, has made an important contribution to the maintenance of peace, security and stability in the region and in the world;

Reaffirming our adherence to the goals and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, other commonly acknowledged principles and rules of international law related to the maintenance of international peace, security and the development of good neighborly and friendly relations, as well as the cooperation between States;

Guided by the provisions of the Declaration on the Creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization of 15 June, 2001,

Have agreed as follows:

Articles 1 Goals and Tasks

The main goals and tasks of SCO are:

to strengthen mutual trust, friendship and good neighborliness between the member States;

to consolidate multidisciplinary cooperation in the maintenance and strengthening of peace, security and stability in the region and promotion of a new democratic, fair and rational political and economic international order;

to jointly counteract terrorism, separatism and extremism in all their manifestations, to fight against illicit narcotics and arms trafficking and other types of criminal activity of a transnational character, and also illegal migration;

to encourage the efficient regional cooperation in such spheres as politics, trade and economy, defense, law enforcement, environment protection, culture, science and technology, education, energy, transport, credit and finance, and also other spheres of common interest;

to facilitate comprehensive and balanced economic growth, social and cultural development in the region through joint action on the basis of equal partnership for the purpose of a steady increase of living standards and improvement of living conditions of the peoples of the member States;

to coordinate approaches to integration into the global economy;

to promote human rights and fundamental freedoms in accordance with the international obligations of the member States and their national legislation;

to maintain and develop relations with other States and international organizations;

to cooperate in the prevention of international conflicts and in their peaceful settlement;

to jointly search for solutions to the problems that would arise in the 21st century.

Articles 2 Principles

The member States of SCO shall adhere to the following principles:

mutual respect of sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity of States and inviolability of State borders, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, non-use of force or threat of its use in international relations, seeking no unilateral military superiority in adjacent areas;

equality of all member States, search of common positions on the basis of mutual understanding and respect for opinions of each of them;

gradual implementation of joint activities in the spheres of mutual interest;

peaceful settlement of disputes between the member States;

SCO being not directed against other States and international organizations;

prevention of any illegitimate acts directed against the SCO interests;

Implementation of obligations arising out of the present Charter and other documents adopted within the framework of SCO, in good faith.

Articles 3 Areas of Cooperation

The main areas of cooperation within SCO shall be the following:

maintenance of peace and enhancing security and confidence in the region;

search of common positions on foreign policy issues of mutual interest, including issues arising within international organisations and international fora;

development and implementation of measures aimed at jointly counteracting terrorism, separatism and extremism, illicit narcotics and arms trafficking and other types of criminal activity of a transnational character, and also illegal migration;

coordination of efforts in the field of disarmament and arms control;

support for, and promotion of regional economic cooperation in various forms, fostering favorable environment for trade and investments with a view to gradually achieving free flow of goods, capitals, services and technologies;

effective use of available transportation and communication infrastructure, improvement of transit capabilities of member States and development of energy systems;

sound environmental management, including water resources management in the region, and implementation of particular joint environmental programs and projects;

mutual assistance in preventing natural and man-made disasters and elimination of their implications;

exchange of legal information in the interests of development of cooperation within SCO;

development of interaction in such spheres as science and technology, education, health care, culture, sports and tourism.

The SCO member States may expand the spheres of cooperation by mutual agreement.

Article 4 Bodies

1. For the implementation of goals and objectives of the present Charter the following bodies shall operate within the Organization:

The Council of Heads of State;

The Council of Heads of Government (Prime Ministers);

The Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs;

Meetings of Heads of Ministries and/or Agencies;

The Council of National Coordinators;

The Regional Antiterrorist Structure;

Secretariat.

2. The functions and working procedures for the SCO bodies, other than the Regional Antiterrorist Structure, shall be governed by appropriate provisions adopted by the Council of Heads of State.

3. The Council of Heads of State may decide to establish other SCO bodies. New bodies shall be established by the adoption of additional protocols to the present Charter which enter into force in the procedure, set forth in Article 21 of this Charter.

Articles 5 The Council of Heads of State

The Council of Heads of State shall be the supreme SCO body. It shall determine priorities and define major areas of activities of the Organisation, decide upon the fundamental issues of its internal arrangement and functioning and its interaction with other States and international organizations, as well as consider the most topical international issues.

The Council shall hold its regular meetings once a year. A meeting of the Council of Heads of State shall be chaired by the head of State organizing this regular meeting. The venue of a regular meeting of the Council shall generally be determined in the Russian alphabetic order of names of the SCO member States.

Article 6 The Council of Heads of Government (Prime Ministers)

The Council of Heads of Government (Prime Ministers) shall approve the budget of the Organisation, consider and decide upon major issues related to particular, especially economic, spheres of interaction within the Organisation.

The Council shall hold its regular meetings once a year. A meeting of the Council shall be chaired by the head of Government (Prime Minister) of the State on whose territory the meeting takes place.

The venue of a regular meeting of the Council shall be determined by prior agreement among heads of Government (Prime Ministers) of the member States.

Article 7 The Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs

The Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs shall consider issues related to day-to-day activities of the Organization, preparation of meetings of the Council of Heads of State and holding of consultations on international problems within the Organization. The Council may, as appropriate, make statements on behalf of SCO.

The Council shall generally meet one month prior to a meeting of the Council of Heads of State. Extraordinary meetings of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs shall be convened on the initiative of at least two member States and upon consent of ministers of foreign affairs of all other member States. The venue of a regular or extraordinary meeting of the Council shall be determined by mutual agreement.

The Council shall be chaired by the minister of foreign affairs of the member State on whose territory the regular meeting of the Council of Heads of State takes place, during the period starting from the date of the last ordinary meeting of the Council of Heads of State to the date of the next ordinary meeting of the Council of Heads of State.

The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs shall represent the Organization in its external contacts, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the Council.

Article 8 Meetings of Heads of Ministries and/or Agencies

According to decisions of the Council of Heads of State and the Council of Heads of Government (Prime Ministers) heads of branch ministries and/or agencies of the member States shall hold, on a regular basis, meetings for consideration of particular issues of interaction in respective fields within SCO.

A meeting shall be chaired by the head of a respective ministry and/or agency of the State organizing the meeting. The venue and date of a meeting shall be agreed upon in advance.

For the preparation and holding meetings the member States may, upon prior agreement, establish permanent or ad hoc working groups of experts which carry out their activities in accordance with the regulations adopted by the meetings of heads of ministries and/or agencies. These groups shall consist of representatives of ministries and/or agencies of the member States.

Article 9 The Council of National Coordinators

The Council of National Coordinators shall be a SCO body that coordinates and directs day-to-day activities of the Organization. It shall make the necessary preparation for the meetings of the Council of Heads of State, the Council of Heads of Government (Prime Ministers) and the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. National coordinators shall be appointed by each member State in accordance with its internal rules and procedures.

The Council shall hold its meetings at least three times a year. A meeting of the Council shall be chaired by the national coordinator of the member State on whose territory the regular meeting of the Council of Heads of State takes place, from the date of the last ordinary meeting of the Council of Heads of State to the date of the next ordinary meeting of the Council of Heads of State.

The Chairman of the Council of National Coordinators may on the instruction of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs represent the Organization in its external contacts, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the Council of National Coordinators.

Article 10

Regional Antiterrorist Structure

The Regional Antiterrorist Structure established by the member States of the Shanghai Convention to combat terrorism, separatism and extremism of 15 June, 2001, located in Bishkek, the Kyrgyz Republic, shall be a standing SCO body.

Its main objectives and functions, principles of its constitution and financing, as well as its rules of procedure shall be governed by a separate international treaty concluded by the member States, and other necessary instruments adopted by them.

Article 11 Secretariat

Secretariat shall be a standing SCO administrative body. It shall provide organizational and technical support to the activities carried out in the framework of SCO and prepare proposals on the annual budget of the Organization.

The Secretariat shall be headed by the Secretary-General to be appointed by the Council of Heads of State on nomination by the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

The Secretary-General shall be appointed from among the nationals of member States on a rotational basis in the Russian alphabetic order of the member States' names for a period of three years without a right to be reappointed for another period.

The Secretary-General deputies shall be appointed by the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs on nomination by the Council of National Coordinators. They cannot be representatives of the State from which the Executive Secretary has been appointed.

The Secretariat officials shall be recruited from among nationals of the member States on a quota basis.

The Secretary-General, his deputies and other Secretariat officials in fulfilling their official duties should not request or receive instructions from any member State and/or government, organization or physical persons. They should refrain from any actions that might affect their status as international officials reporting to SCO only.

The member States shall undertake to respect the international character of the duties of the Secretary-General, his deputies and Secretariat staff and not to exert any influence upon them as they perform their official functions.

The SCO Secretariat shall be located at Beijing (the People's Republic of China).

Article 12 Financing

SCO shall have its own budget drawn up and executed in accordance with a special agreement between member States. This agreement shall also determine the amount of contributions paid annually by member States to the budget of the Organization on the basis of a cost-sharing principle.

Budgetary resources shall be used to finance standing SCO bodies in accordance with the above agreement. The member States shall cover themselves the expenses related to the participation of their representatives and experts in the activities of the Organization.

Article 13 Membership

The SCO membership shall be open for other States in the region that undertake to respect the objectives and principles of this Charter and to comply with the provisions of other international treaties and instruments adopted in the framework of SCO.

The admission of new members to SCO shall be decided upon by the Council of Heads of State on the basis of a representation made by the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in response to an official request from the State concerned addressed to the acting Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

SCO membership of a member State violating the provisions of this Charter and/or systematically failing to meet its obligations under international treaties and instruments, concluded in the framework of SCO, may be suspended by a decision of the Council of Heads of State adopted on the basis of a representation made by the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. If this State goes on violating its obligations, the Council of Heads of State may take a decision to expel it from SCO as of the date fixed by the Council itself.

Any member State shall be entitled to withdraw from SCO by transmitting to the Depositary an official notification of its withdrawal from this Charter no later than twelve months before the date of withdrawal. The obligations arising from participation in this Charter and other instruments adopted within the framework of SCO shall be binding for the corresponding States until they are completely fulfilled.

Article 14 Relationship with Other States and International Organizations

SCO may interact and maintain dialogue, in particular in certain areas of cooperation, with other States and international organizations.

SCO may grant to the State or international organization concerned the status of a dialogue partner or observer. The rules and procedures for granting such a status shall be established by a special agreement of member States.

This Charter shall not affect the rights and obligations of the member States under other international treaties in which they participate.

Article 15 Legal Capacity

As a subject of international law, SCO shall have international legal capacity. It shall have such a legal capacity in the territory of each member State, which is required to achieve its goals and objectives.

SCO shall enjoy the rights of a legal person and may in particular:

- conclude treaties;
- acquire movable and immovable property and dispose of it;
- appear in court as litigant;
- open accounts and have monetary transactions made.

Article 16 Decisions-Taking Procedure

The SCO bodies shall take decisions by agreement without vote and their decisions shall be considered adopted if no member State has raised objections during the vote (consensus), except for the decisions on suspension of membership or expulsion from the Organization that shall be taken by “consensus minus one vote of the member State concerned”.

Any member State may expose its opinion on particular aspects and/or concrete issues of the decisions taken which shall not be an obstacle to taking the decision as a whole. This opinion shall be placed on record.

Should one or several member States be not interested in implementing particular cooperation projects of interest to other member States, non-participation of the above said member States in these projects shall not prevent the implementation of such cooperation projects by the member States concerned and, at the same time, shall not prevent the said member States from joining such projects at a later stage.

Article 17 Implementation of Decisions

The decisions taken by the SCO bodies shall be implemented by the member States in accordance with the procedures set out in their national legislation.

Control of the compliance with obligations of the member States to implement this Charter, other agreements and decisions adopted within SCO shall be exercised by the SCO bodies within their competence.

Article 18 Permanent Representatives

In accordance with their domestic rules and procedures, the member States shall appoint their permanent representatives to the SCO Secretariat, which will be members of the diplomatic staff of the embassies of the member States in Beijing.

Article 19 Privileges and Immunities

SCO and its officials shall enjoy in the territories of all member States the privileges and immunities which are necessary for fulfilling functions and achieving goals of the Organization.

The volume of privileges and immunities of SCO and its officials shall be determined by a separate international treaty.

Article 20 Languages

The official and working languages of SCO shall be Russian and Chinese.

Article 21 Duration and Entry into Force

This Charter shall be of indefinite duration.

This Charter shall be subject to ratification by signatory States and shall enter into force on the thirtieth day following the date of the deposit of the fourth instrument of ratification.

For a State which signed this Charter and ratified it thereafter it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification with the Depositary.

Upon its entering into force this Charter shall be open for accession by any State.

For each acceding State this Charter shall enter into force on the thirtieth day following the date of receiving by the Depositary of appropriate instruments of accession.

Article 22 Settlement of Disputes

In case of disputes or controversies arising out of interpretation or application of this Charter member States shall settle them through consultations and negotiations.

Article 23 Amendments and Additions

By mutual agreement of member States this Charter can be amended and supplemented. Decisions by the Council of Heads of State concerning amendments and additions shall be formalized by separate protocols which shall be its integral part and enter into force in accordance with the procedure provided for by Article 21 of this Charter.

Article 24 Reservations

No reservations can be made to this Charter which contradict the principles, goals and objectives of the Organization and could prevent any SCO body from performing its functions. If at least two thirds of member States have objections the reservations must be considered as contradicting the principles, goals and objectives of the Organization or preventing any body from performing its functions and being null and void.

Article 25 Depositary

The People's Republic of China shall be the Depositary of this Charter.

Article 26 Registration

Pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations, this Charter is subject to registration with the Secretariat of the United Nations.

Done at Saint-Petersburg the seventh day of June 2002 in a single original in the Chinese and Russian languages, both texts being equally authoritative.

The original copy of this Charter shall be deposited with the Depositary who will circulate its certified copies to all signatory States.


Source: China Daily 2006. Shanghai Cooperation Organization Charter. Available at: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-06/12/content_614628.htm, [accessed 2011, 11, 23].

Table 4. Institutionalization of Shanghai Five vs. SCO: Meeting and Organs

	Shanghai Five, 1996-2000	Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 2001-
<i>Type/level of meeting held</i>	<i>Location and date of meeting</i>	
Summit	Shanghai, April 26, 1996	Shanghai, June 14-15, 2001
Head of state	Moscow, April 24, 1997 Almaty, July 3, 1998 Bishkek, August 24-26, 1999 Dushanbe, July 5, 2000	St. Petersburg, June 7, 2002 Moscow, May 28-29, 2003 Tashkent, June 17, 2004 Astana, July 5, 2005 Shanghai, June 15-16, 2006
Heads of government/ prime ministers		Almaty, September 13-14, 2001 Beijing, September 23, 2003 Bishkek, September 23, 2004 Moscow, October 26, 2005
Ministerial level		
Ministers of foreign affairs	July 4, 2000 April 28, 2001	January 7, 2002 April 26, 2002 September 5, 2002 October 23, 2003 April 29, 2003 January 15, 2004 April 23, 2004 February 25, 2005
Ministers of defense	March 28, 2000	November 20, 2002 September 10, 2003
Ministers of culture		April 11-12, 2002 July 2005 April 27-28, 2006
Ministers of economy and trade		May 28-29, 2002 September 5-6, 2003
Ministers of transport		November 20, 2002 September 10, 2003
Parliamentary speakers		May 30, 2006
Committee/agency/department level		
Heads of law-enforcement bodies and security services (Bishkek group)	November 1999	October 10-11, 2001 May 23, 2002
Departments of emergencies		April 29-30, 2002
Prosecutors general		October 30, 2002 September 3-4, 2003
Council of National Coordinators		16 meetings by June 2006
Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure Council		October 31, 2003 May 1, 2004 March 30, 2005 September 2005 March 29, 2006
Permanent staff		
Secretariat, Beijing, China		Headed by secretary-general 3 deputy secretaries 1 assistant secretary 30 staff members
Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure, Tashkent, Uzbekistan		Headed by executive director Permanent representatives

Source: Chien-peng Chung (2006, p6-7)

Figure 1. The Structure of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization



Source: Wikipedia, available at: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/e/e7/Structure_of_the_SCO.png, [accessed 2011, 11, 23].

References

1. Flemming Hansen, 2008. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Asian Affairs, vol. XXXIX, no. II, July 2008.
2. For the profile of participating states of SCO, please see Appendix table 1 and the map.
3. See Appendix table 3.
4. For information of all summits, please see Table 2.
5. Xinhua Net 2010. Shanghai Cooperation Organization SCO. Available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2002-06/01/content_418824.htm, [accessed 2011, 11, 13].
6. The SCO embodies a spirit that is the “Shanghai Spirit” whose essence is mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, consultation, respect for diverse civilizations and seeking common development.
7. Muratbek Imanaliyev. An Interview with Muratbek Imanaliyev (Secretary-General of the SCO), conducted by Fen Wang, Oct., 2011.
8. Ibid.
9. N Zaderei, 2008. *Evolution of the Western Attitude Toward the Shanghai Cooperation Organization*. “Far Eastern Studies” Journal (Bimonthly) (1) 2008.
10. David Wall. *The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: uneasy amity*. Published on Open Democracy, 2006. Available at: http://www.opendemocracy.net/globalization_institutions_government/shanghai_cooperation_3653.jsp, [Accessed 2011, 05, 01].
11. Ariel Cohen. After the G-8 Summit: *China and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization*. China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Volume 4, No. 3 (2006) p. 51-64.
12. Flemming Splidsboel Hansen, 2008. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Asian Affairs, vol. XXXIX, no. II, July 2008.
13. Simon Tisdall. *Irresistible rise of the dictators’ club*. The Guardian, 2006. Available at: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2006/jun/06/world.comment>, [accessed 2011, 6, 25].
14. Alyson J. K. Bailes, PálDunay, Pan Guang and Mikhail Troitskiy. *The Shanghai Cooperation Organization*. SIPRI Policy Paper No. 17. Published by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2007, p8.
15. Mate, R. NATO of the East? An International Relations Analysis of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Conference Papers -- Midwestern Political Science Association, 1. 2009, retrieved from EBSCO host, p20.
16. Ibid.
17. Woodrow, Thomas. China Brief: The New Great Game. The Jamestown Foundation, 3 (3): 11, 2003.
18. Ariel Pable Sznajder. China’s Shanghai Cooperation Organization Strategy. Journal of IPS/Spring 2006/Volume 5, p93.
19. Same as note 1.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.
23. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
24. Bailes et al., 2008 in Anna Matveeva and Antonio Giustozzi, 2008. The SCO: A Regional Organization in the Making. Crisis States Research Centre, Crisis States Working Papers Series No.2.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Tsung-Yen Chen, 2009. The Authoritarian Club: The Creation of Shanghai Cooperation Organization. This paper was written for a graduate seminar "International Organization" in the spring quarter of 2008 at the Stanford University.
29. Bailes et al., 2006:6.
30. Ely Ratner, 2011. The Emergent Security Threats Reshaping China's Rise. The Washington Quarterly • 34:1 pp. 29_44, p37. Available at: http://www.twq.com/11winter/docs/11winter_Ratner.pdf, [Accessed 2011, 05, 30].
31. Senior Consultant of China International Institute for Strategic Society.
32. ZhengBijian 2011 in Cankaoa 2011. "Wu Jianguo states that the Taiwan should develop new thinking towards cross-strait policies." Available at: http://www.cankaoa.com/Article/haixia/27829_3.html, [Accessed 2011, 06, 01].
33. Gao Fei 2010. The Shanghai Cooperation and China's New Diplomacy, published by Ragnhild Drange and Joseph Ancy, 2007. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Offshoot of Chinese Diplomacy. Dissertation Submitted to Stella Maris College.
34. Zhongxinwang 2011.ZhengBijian: China's peaceful rise forms a community of interests of different stakeholders. Available at: <http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2011/04-23/2993145.shtml> [Accessed: 2011, 5, 22].
35. Ibid.
36. Kevin Sheives, 2006. China Turns West: Beijing's Contemporary Strategy Towards Central Asia. *Pacific Affairs: Volume 79, No. 2* – Summer 2006. p219
37. Ibid.
38. Campbell, M. Kurt, NiravPatel, Vikram J. Singh, 2008. The Power of Balance: America in iAsia. Center for a New American Security. 2008, June. Together with insights drawn from The Art of War of Sun Tzu; Ding Li 2010, Joseph 2007.
39. Ibid.
40. Ariel Pablo Sznajder. *China's Shanghai Cooperation Organization Strategy*. Journal of IPS/Spring 2006/Volume 5. P 52-54.
41. Joseph Ancy. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: Offshoot of Chinese Diplomacy. 2007. Available at: <http://www.stellamariscollege.org/departments/is1/SMC%20IS%20Dissertation3.pdf>, [Accessed 2011, 07, 01].
42. Li Xing. On the Future Development of Shanghai Cooperation Organization--Angles based on comparative analysis of strategic thought of China and Russia. "Northeast Asia Forum" No. 1, 2009.
43. Ibid.

44. Fravel 2005 in Tsung-Yen Chen. Eradicating Separatism: China's Intentions in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Research Specialist, Taiwan Brain Trust, M.A., Stanford University. 2010.
45. Joseph Ancy, 2007, p 70.
46. Alyson J. K. Bailes, PálDunay, Pan Guang and Mikhail Troitskiy, 2007. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization. SIPRI Policy Paper No. 17. Published by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. P 6.
47. Deng Xiaoping. Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan, vol. 2 (Beijing: Reminchubanshe, 1994), 161.
48. Josef 2010:38-73.
49. Sun Zhuangzhi (2006). "New Security Perspective and its practical application of Shanghai Cooperation Organization." Edited by Xing Guangcheng: "2006 Development Report of Russia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia""Social Sciences Academic Press, April 2007 Edition.
50. Ibid, p39.
51. Subodh Atal. The New Great Game. The National Interest—Fall 2005. p101-102.
52. Joseph Ancy, 2007; And Saaler Sven, Koschmann J. Victor. Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History: Colonialism, Regionalism and Borders. Routledge; New edition (December 28, 2006); And Facius Michael. The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia: Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asian thought. H-Net Reviews in the Humanities & Social Sciences, Nov2009.
53. Alyson JK Bailes. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Europe. China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Volume 5, No. 3 (2007) p. 13-18. P 13. Available at: http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/CEF/Quarterly/August_2007/Bailes.pdf, [Accessed 2011, 05, 01].
54. Li Xin. Strategic Analysis of Russia and Eurasian economic integration. Academic Communications. 2010 NO. 8.
55. Alyson JK Bailes, 2007. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Europe. China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Volume 5, No. 3 (2007) p. 13-18. P13. Available at: http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/CEF/Quarterly/August_2007/Bailes.pdf, [Accessed 2011, 05, 01]; Alexander Cooley, 2009. The Stagnation of the SCO Competing Agendas and Divergent Interests in Central Asia. PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 85. Available at: http://www.gwu.edu/~ieresegwu/assets/docs/pepm_085.pdf, [accessed 2011, 05, 01].
56. Beiles and Dunay 2006:12.
57. Campbell 2008:42.
58. Anna Matveeva and Antonio Giustozzi, 2008. The SCO: a regional organization in the making. Crisis States Research Centre, Crisis States Working Papers Series No.2.
59. Graeme Gill, "Red Star in the Pacific?" Australia Strategic Policy Institute Strategic Policy Forum Series (28 August 2007).
60. Bhadrakumar M. K. 2011. SCO steps out of Central Asia. Asian Times Online, available at: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/MF18Ag01.html, [Accessed: 2011, 6, 20] and US breathes life into a new cold war. Available at: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/MF07Ag01.html [Accessed: 2011, 6, 21].

61. Campbell et al., 2008:48.
62. Cankaoxiaoxi 2011. The “four northern islands” upgraded as geopolitical hot spots in Asia. Available at: http://www.ckxx.info/focus/focus_2011-2-23_41256/, [Accessed: 2011, 5, 12].
63. Campbell et al., 2008:48; Vladimir Ivanov (Institute of Russian Academy of Sciences Far East Research Center of Japan), in Cankaoxiaoxi 2011, available at: http://www.ckxx.info/focus/focus_2011-5-17_46103/, [Accessed 2011, 05, 12].
64. Cohen 2006, p54.
65. Gonzalez F. Benjamin, 2001. Charting a New Silk Road? The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Russian Foreign Policy. University of Oregon, 2001. Available at: <http://dspace.library.uvic.ca:8080/bitstream/1828/204/1/Charting%20a%20New%20Silk%20Road.pdf>, [Accessed 2011, 05, 13].
66. Joseph Ancy, 2007.
67. Ibid, p43-100.
68. Campbell 2008:48
69. Bhadrakumar 2011.
70. Ibid, p7.
71. Joseph 2007:97.
72. Maslov, Alexei. 2007. ‘Two-headed SCO. Russia and China fight not only the uni-polar world, but also each other for influence in the organization’ (in Russian), *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 24 September.
73. Beiles and Dunay 2006:10-11.
74. Ibid, p11; Brian Carlson, 2007. *The Limits of Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership in Central Asia*, p1. Available at: <http://www.princeton.edu/jpia/past-issues-1/2007/8.pdf>, [Accessed 2011, 09, 15].
75. Note: e.g. Russia and China joint maneuvers in 2005, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010.
76. Ferdinand Peter, 2007. Sunset, sunrise: China and Russia construct a new relationship. *International Affairs* 83: 5 (2007) 841–867. P854.
77. Ibid, p11; Brian Carlson, 2007. *The Limits of Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership in Central Asia*, p1. Available at: <http://www.princeton.edu/jpia/past-issues-1/2007/8.pdf>, [Accessed 2011, 09, 15].
78. The term Western area does not mean the modern Western states, but more the western area of Han that time, which is Central Asia region.
79. Si Maqian, Historical Records. Writing Finished in Xihan Dynasty.
80. Cohen 2006, p5.
81. Josef 2010:35.
82. Beiles and Dunay 2006: 14.
83. Sun Zhuangahi, New and Old Regionalism: *The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Sino-Central Asian Relations*. *The Review of International Affairs*, Vol.3, No.4, Summer 2004, pp. 600 – 612.
84. see IWASHITA.
85. Maksutov, p29, in Beiles and Dunay 2006:17.

86. Beiles and Dunay 2006:16.
87. Murat Laumulin, 2006. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization as “Geopolitical Bluff?” A View from Astana. Research Programme Russia/NIS. Available at: http://www.ifri.org/files/Russie/laumullin_english.pdf, p8-9, [Accessed 2011, 05, 30].
88. Ibid, p8-9.
89. Ibid, p18.
90. Fang Hua, 2011. See where the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is heading. Available at: <http://www.chinese.rfi.fr/>, [Accessed 2011, 6, 22].
91. Cohen 2006, p3.
92. Josof 2010:37.
93. Beiles and Dunay 2006:14.
94. Sun Zhuangzhi (2007).
95. Note: Iran has an overt interest in further energy cooperation, particularly with China through ever growing bilateral engagement. In 2006, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad invited the six SCO member states to Tehran to discuss further energy exploitation and development methods, financial and technological support, and trade and infrastructure construction.
96. Brummer Matthew, 2007. The Shanghai Corporation Organization and Iran: A Power-full Union. Journal of International Affairs, Spring/Summer 2007, vol. 60; Campbell, M. Kurt, Nirav Patel, Vikram J. Singh, 2008. The Power of Balance: America in Asia. Center for a New American Security. 2008, June.
97. Subodh Atal, 2005. The New Great Game. The National Interest—Fall 2005. P103.
98. Sergei Lavrov (2011) in RUSNEWS.CN. Russian Foreign Minister: Lifting sanctions would open up a road for Iran’s joining into the SCO. 2011-05-13. Available at: http://www.rusnews.cn/eguoxinwen/eluosi_duiwai/20110513/43045483.html, [Accessed: 2011, 6, 03].
99. Karon Tony 2011. Could Iran’s Defiance of Western Nuclear Demands be a Rational Choice? Available at: <http://globalspin.blogs.time.com/2011/06/15/could-irans-defiance-of-western-nuclear-demands-be-a-rational-choice>, [Accessed 2011, 6, 21].
100. Cohen 2007, p7.
101. See IWASHITA.
102. See the Great Game.
103. Frederick Starr, “A Partnership for Central Asia,” Foreign Affairs, 84, 4 (July/August, 2005).
104. Atal 2005, p103.
105. Beiles and Dunay 2006:18.
106. Atal 2005, p104.
107. Beiles and Dunay 2006:18.
108. Sachdeva Gulshan 2006. India’s Attitude towards China’s Growing Influence in Central Asia. *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly*, Volume 4, No. 3 (2006) p. 23-34, P32; And Insights drawn from the New Great game.
109. Ibid, p26.
110. Beiles and Dunay 2006:20.

111. See IWASHITA
112. RUSNEWS.CN 2009. Prime Minister of Pakistan hopes to play an active role in SCO. 2009-10-14. Available at: http://www.rusnews.cn/eguoxinwen/eluosi_duiwai/20091014/42607498.html, [Accessed: 2011, 6, 03].
113. RUSNEWS.CN2011. RussiasupportsPakistanjoiningtheSCO.2011-05-12.Available at: http://www.rusnews.cn/eguoxinwen/eluosi_duiwai/20110512/43044847.html, [Accessed: 2011, 6, 03].
114. RUSNEWS.CN, 2011. Russia supports Pakistan's joining the SCO. 2011-05-12. Available at: http://www.rusnews.cn/eguoxinwen/eluosi_duiwai/20110512/43044847.html, [Accessed: 2011, 6, 03].
115. Bhadrakumar, 2011.
116. Ding Li 2010. Grand Geostrategy. Published by Press of People of Shan'xi, 2010, 02. 01.
117. Pan Guang, Astana Summit: *Unfolding a New Stage in the Pragmatic Development of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization*. Available at: Center of SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION (SCO) Studies, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, 2005.
118. Starr 2005:15.
119. Niklas Swanström. An interview with Dr. Swanström, conducted by Fen Wang, Sep.
120. Ibid.
121. Bates Gill. An interview with Bates Gill, conducted by Fen Wang, on Sep. 29, 2011.
122. Sun Zhuangzhi. An interview with Secretary of SCO Studies at China Academy of Social Sciences. Conducted by Fen Wang, Sep.
123. Ibid.
124. Mr. Anonymous. An interview with Mr. Anonymous (SCO studies involved researcher), conducted by Fen Wang, in Sep., 2011.
125. Ibid.
126. Niklas Swanström. An interview with Dr. Swanström, conducted by Fen Wang, Sep.
127. Same as note 121.
128. Same as note 122.
129. Ibid.
130. Same as note 121.
131. Ibid.
132. Same as note 124.
133. Same as note 111.
134. Same as note 126.
135. Same as note 111.
136. Zhang Deguang. The SCO and the Changes of Eurasian Geopolitics. Russian Studies, 2006, No. 2, 140).
137. Pan Guang, Astana Summit: Unfolding a New Stage in the Pragmatic Development of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Available at: Center of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Studies, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences.
138. Popovik 2010. Keeping Friends Close and their Oil Closer: Rethinking the Role of SCO in China's strive for Energy Security in Kazakhstan . Submitted to Department

of International Relations and European Studies, Central European University.

139. Joseph Ancy, 2007, p8.
140. Niklas Swanstrom. *China and Central Asia: a new Great Game or traditional vassal relations?* *Journal of Contemporary China*, Volume 14, Number 45, November 2005, pp. 569-584(16)
141. Joseph 2007:p46.
142. Pan Guang 2007. Bishkek: SCO's *Success in the Hinterland of Eurasia*. China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Volume 5, No. 4 (2007) p. 3-6.
143. Joseph 2007:55.
144. Norichika Kanie 2010. *Green Growth and A New World Order*. Available at: http://www.globalasia.org/V4N4_Winter_2010/Norichika_Kanie.html, [accessed 2011, 9, 27].